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Chapter I:

Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology

~he

far horizons of a phenomenological philosophy,
the chief structural formations, to speak geographically,
have disclosed themselves; the essential groups of problems
and the methods of approach on essential lines have been
made clear. The author sees the infinite open country of
the true philosophy, the 11 promised land" on which he
himself will never set foot. '1·his confidence may wake
a smile, but let each see for himself whether it has not
some ground in the fragments laid before him as phenomenology
in its beginnings. Gladly would he hope that those who come
after will take up these first ventures, carry them steadily
forwexd, yes, and improve also their great deficiencies,
defects of incompleteness which cannot indeed be avoided
in the beginnings of scientific work.
--Edmund Husserl, rdeas 1,
Authors Preface to
the .t;nglish Edition, p. 21.

2

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is popularly acknowledged as the father
of phenomenology.

11hile

phenomenological movement.
Is~ae:Iites

alive, he was recognized as the leader or a
He saw

himse~f

as

a modern Moses leading his

towards the promised land or a phenomenological philosophy.

Like the land promised to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and 1·or which they
longed, phenomenology is said to be "the secret longing of the philosophy
of modern times;" and vescartes, Hume

and Kant are claimed as Husserl's

philosophical forefathers. 1 Like Moses who saw his promised land from a
lonely mountaintop, Husserl claimed to see the outstanding geographic
features of his philosophy.
enter:

But again like Moses,- he was forbidden to

he felt obligated to cover only the ground in its immediate

vicinity.

Phenomenology is said to be a land on which he never set

foot.
It must be difficult to live with one•s goal in sight while not being
able to reach it.

We search the hearts of men in situations like

this in

hopes of discovering something important about their humanity. But the
heart of Moses is not open to us.

We are told only that after wandering in

the wilderness for forty years and almost reaching his destination,
"his eye was not dim nor his natural force abated."
hand, does not present such an enigmatic figure.
retained his keen eyesight.

Husserl, on the other

He too is supposed to have

He also claims to see the humour in our doubting

what he sees from his mountaintop, indicating that he appreciates the irony
of his situation.

He is not without humility and humour

himself.

His

inVi£ation to test the old man's eyesight speaks of quiet confidence and
feelings of philosophical

solidity and integri tJ.

extent these feelings are justified.

Let us see to what

3

Although Husserl's days of leadership came to an end in
posterity continues

19~8,

to acknowledge him as the father of phenomenology.

His paternity endures in the supposedly seminal books he has vrritten.
His thoughts are said to germinate in the soil of other minds.

But it is

not exactly clear to us what he meant by a phenomenological philosophy.
What is the promised land towerds \'lhich he we.a supposed to be leading other
philosophers?

How near was he able to approach it

himself~

This thesis

is an attempt to answer these two questions.
students of phenomenology are fond of defining it as the practice
of letting things speak for themselves.

"Back to.the things themselves!"

is their slogan. 2

Husserl's writings may at first seem to lend support to

their definition.

For example, he writes in the ideas:

General Introduction

to Pure PhenomenolofY that:
the generalization of the correlative, mutually
attached concepts "intuition" and "object" is
not a casual whim, but is compellingly
demanded by the nature of things. 3
In The Paris Lectures, he writes that:
science demands proof by reference to the things
and facts themselves as they are given in
actual eA'}lerience and intuition. Thus guided, we,
the beginning philosophers, make it a rule to
judge only by the eVidence. 4
.1:1e claims in the Cartesian Nedi tations that:
the idea of science and philosophy involves •••
a beginning and a line of advance that •••
have their basis "in the nature of things
themselves."5
These passages testify that the popular slogan captures the spirit of
Husserl's endeavour.

They al.so indicate its importance as a methodolor:ical

principle for a philosophy which pretends to be scientific.

They do not,

4

however, champion it as an adequate definition.
Without

denying its

usefulness in defining phenomenology, i.t can

be pointed out that the popular expression alone is apt to be misleading.
The expression "Back to the things themselves!" brings to mind Hume's
positivistic doctrine that "all our simple ideas ••• are derived from
simple impressions which are correspondent to them and which they exactly
represent. 116

With Hume's picture image theory of ideas in mind, it is

tempting to think of phenomenology as an empiricism in the style of
Locke's, Berkeley's and Hume's.

But actually, it originated in Husserl's

and Brentano•s criticism of the British empiricists. 7
Husserl's definition of phenomenology includes more information
than the populc'-r slogan.

In fact, enough is included to distinguish it

from British empiricism.

''Phenomenology," Husserl frequently says,

"figures as a science within the limits of mere immediate intuition,
a pure descriptive science of Essential Being.rr8

The words that recur

again and again in his definitions are essential being, immediate
intuition and descriptive science.

To clarify Husserl's definition,·

it must be shown what kind of things he wanted to return to, how he
proposed to get back to them, and wh&t methodological role the
commandment to return to the things themselves plays in a scientific
description.
(1) Husserl's Idea of Essential Being.
Let us first examine Husserl's idea of Essence or Essential Being
(Wesen) to deternine what kind of things he wcints to return to.9
Husserl was preoccupied throughout his philosophical career with the problem
of how to account for the objectivity of human knowledge.

So central was

5

this problem to his interests that his intellectuaJ. development could
be described as a Growing awareness of the universality of his praolem. 10
in 1891, seven years after receiVing his doctorate in mathematics,
Husserl began his philosophical career by publishing the Philosonhy of
Arithmetic in which he

~ried

to account for the objectiVity of mathematical

knowledge by tracing its fundamental concepts to our ability to notice the
aggregate chc.racter of our perceptions.11

Realizing the close connection

between mathematics and loc,"ic, Husserl made another attempt to expla:i..n
wha~

mrures this type ot knowledge possible in his

Lot~cal

Investiriations,

published 1900-1901, where he repudiated the psychologistic Views which
he supposedly expressed earlier in the Arithmetic.

12

Nevertheless, in the

second volume of the Investigations he continued to analyze both logical
concepts and our consciousness of them.

Finally realizing the universality

of his problem, Husserl described his Ideas:
Phenomenology, published 1913, as

11

General Introduction to Pure

a fresh formulation of the transcendental

problem which forecasts with objective necessity the true meaning of an
objective being that is subjectively knowable. 1113

At this point, Husserl

recognized that what maKes any object subjectively knowable is its
Essential Being.

In Ideas 1 Husserl attempts to articulate this insight.

His later works, Cartesian tHidi tations published l 931 and The Crisis of

European Science and ·.i:re.nscendental Phenomenology published 1936, are
concerned with the task of extending the application of this insight to
t/ie world we live in (Lebcnsvrcl t).

The work occupyine the pivotal position in Husserl's philosophy is
Ideas 1 beco.use there for the first time he realizes the universality of
his problem and tries to articulate the notion of Essential Being as its

6

answer.

An examination of the first chapter of Ideas 1, entitled

''Fact and Essence", should give us an idea of whet Husserl means by the
term

~ssential

14

Being.

The problem of the foundetion of objective knowledge seems to
that

de~and

Husserl should trace our knowledge of objects to its source.

precisely what he does.

This is

The kind of knowledge he examines in chapter one

is our knowledge of facts.

Factual or natural knowledge, he says, begins

with our experience of individual things.

Nature or the world is taken

to be nothing more than the sum-total of these individuels.

'.l'hey are

first given to us as obJects of perception; we have "outer" perception of
physical objects, "inner" perception of ourselves and our stc,tes of
consciousness; and we become acquainted with other people through
"empathy" and by perceiving their bodily behavior.
sub-divide the problem of natural

15

f.'e shall later

knowledge into those of the object of

perception, the world of obJects, and other people in the world.
for the present our concern is for the common

But

foundation of all three

types of knowledge.
All natural knowledge is based on our perception of individual things.
What does it mean for something to be perceived as an object?
se.ys

Husserl

that:
An individual object is not simply and quite generally an
individual, a "this-there" something unique; but being
constituted thus and thus "in itself" it has its o\'m
supply of essential predicables which r.iust qualify it
(qua "Being as it is in itself"), if other secoygary
relative determinations are to qualify it also.

A perceived object, for example, an individual tone, is a unique thing
existing here and now.

Its existence here and now we call its "Real

7

Being."

17

But there are several things v1e can s&y e,bout it that we can

say with equal justice about other unique individuals.

First of

all,

it is a part of its being that is should exist under the general ruberic
individual,

in this case, as an individual sound.

It also has its own

supply of essential predicables "which can be justly applied to a number of
other perceived objects."

The "corr.moo element" which makes this possible

is their "Essential Being".

It is part of the meaning of a perceived

object that it should have "Essential" as well as "Real" existence.
Any object of perception has essential existence.
being is no more

simple than its real existence.

Its essential

In his Logical

Investigations, Husserl offers whole and part, subject and quality,
individual and species, species and genus as a -few of the essential
structures in which the existence of an individual object is involved.

18

These essential structures may be divided into two radically different
kinds.

ve may use Husserl's

exa~ple

distinctive logic of each kind.
parts.

of a tone to illustrate the

First, a tone exists as a whole having

These parts may, in their turn, be analyzed into yet other perts.

The fornier relationship of a whole to its parts belongs to the kind of
essential being Husserl calls formal..

By

this he means that the relation-

ship applies equally well to any object of perception.

It is not peculiar

to any class of them.
The individual tone has another kind of essential being besides its
formal essence.

This kind of essential being can belong to some individuals

and not to others.
essence.

~he

tone, for example, can be subsumed under a material

It can be classified as a sound.

19

Later, in ldea.s 1, Husserl especially werns us not to confuse the

8

subsumption of

~

individual

under an essence with the subordination of

that essence under a hi0her species or genus.

20

The class of sounds, for

example, can be subordinated to a higher genus, object-of-one-of-our
senses.
confusing

To confuse the former with the latter would be a case of

a material with a formal relationship.

An object of perception, in the broedeat sense possible, is a whole
which can be analyzed into parts; it is also an individual v1hich can be
put into a class v.rith other individuals.

Its essential being is both

formal and material.
But factual knowledge is suppose to tell us about unique individuals.
In neither case does the individual seem to be unique.

The uniqueness of

an individual can be reconciled with its essential being in the following
way.

Using Husserl's example

of "this-herenessil.
be heard.

of the tone, we find thct it has an element

We can fix the time and the place at which it can

Its uniqueness conSists in the fact that at no other time or

in any other place can I hear as I do here
unique.
same.

21

a~d

now.

A perception is

under no circumstances does it return to me individually the
Nevertheless, I and any number of other people can hear the

same tone or the same tonal structure at different times and places.
We do so, for example,
Ninth Symphony.

whene~er

we hear an orchestra perform Beethoven•s

I know I can listen to the same symphony again and again

22
.
even th ou:;1l I cm never h ave th e same au dit ory sensat ions.
A perceived individual can be both an object and subjectively knowable.

Its uniqueness is due to the unique spatio-temporality of our perceptions,
and its objectivity to the esseice under which it is subsumed or into
v.hich it can be divided.

This is the meaning of an objective being which can

be subjectively known.

The essence or an individual tells us wh:o:t it is,

23

while the this-thereness of our perception tells us of its real
existence.

24

Essences are the foundation of factual knowledge in the sense that
they make possible our awareness of individuals as objects having partwhole relationships and he.vine; membership in certain classes.

All

factual knowlede;e, all scientific analysis and classification of perceived
individuals depends on the recognition of their essential being.

It is

the essence of what we perceive that accounts for our awareness of
individuals as objects.
When factual knowledge is collected scientifically, the objectivity
of the resulting scientific doctrines depends upon the perception of
individuals.

The most fundamental procedures of a factual science are

the analysis and classification of "this" individual perceiver to be "here".
All factual sciences share this dependency regardless of wnether they are
natural sciences like physics, biology, physiology and psychology, or
25

sciences of man like history, anthropology and sociology.

The factual sciences require a justification of their procedure.
The analysis and classification of individuals is justified only if "every
fact includes an essential factor of a material order. 11

The essential

being "oust furnish a law th0t binds the given concrete instance, and
generally every possible one as well."

26

An individual may be said to he.Ve essential being in
ways:
class.

tv10

different

formally e.s a whole having parts, and materially as a member of a
The subordination of a class to a higher genus is a case of

purely formal eidetics not involving the

indiv~dual

at

~11.

Since the

10

formal relationship of a w:'.lole to its :perts preclude special reference
to any inriividual, the foundation of the existence of a perceived
individual as an object must be its material essence.

Husserl

sa~s

that

the most inclusive material essences delimit regions or catecories of
individuals.

27

'.L'hese regions are the foundation of all factual knowledge

and all factual sciences.

If it is really the material essence of what

we perceive that accounts for our awareness of individuals as objects,
then Husserl's search for the foundation of knowledge should be directed
by

the question of how he proposes to return to the essences themselves.
(2) Husserl•s Idea of Immediate Intuition.
Husserl claims that the poEsibility of the seeing of essences
.

.

tWesenschauJ is involved in our perception of individuals.

28

Our seeing

of a class, for example the class of tones, is involved in our perception
of one of its class members (i.e., this tone here).

Husserl sucgests

that any empirical intuition cnn be transformed into an essential insight:
Empirical or individual intuition can be transformed
into essential insight \ideation)-a possibility
which is itself not to be understood as empirical
but as essential possibility. The object of such
insight is then the corresponding pure essence or
eidos, whether it be the highest cateeory or one
of its spec;§lizations, right down to the fu~ly
11
concrete. 11
Any empirical intuition which gives an indiVidual object to consciousless can be transformed into an essential insight.
·s

accomp~ished

The transfoI'l:lation

by an act of ideation, or to use the se.ne example, by

vhinking of the class of which the individual is perceived to be a member.
~he
~n

act of ideation has the character of a dator act, that is, it gives
object to consciousness.

30

Its object is one of the classes of which

J1

the individual is e member.

Husserl does not say so, but presuMably

seeing of each higher de6ree of generality is the

yroduc~

~he

of anotner

higher act of ideation.
Immediate intuition presents an object to consciousness.

There are

two kinds of intuition, the perception of individuals and the essential
intuition of generalities of a class of individuals for exnmple.
of intuition can be transformed into another.

One kind

But the two kinds remain

distinct because they are directed towards particular and general objects
respectively.
Essential intuition,

however, can be confused with the procedures of

induction and formalization because all three of
realm of the universal.

them operate within the

As a result of this confusion, the essences or

things themselves of Husserl's phenomenology may be mistaken for
inductive or formal generalities.

When these three kinds of knowledge

are distinguished, Husserl's ideas of essence and essential

~ntuition

will be made clearer.
Husserl warns us not to confuse the inductive generality of natural
laws Ylith the essential generality of eidetic judgments.

31

He offers

tfie proposition "all bodies are heavy•• as an example of such a J.aw, and
he contrasts it with the eiditic generality of the claim that "all bodies
are extended".

These differ on three counts.

First, naturai laws cust

refer to individuals having real existence, while eiditic judgments like
the geometrical one used in Husserl's example need not.
Furthermore, the

inductive generality of natural laws is founded on

the actual perception of individuals, while eiditic generalities are
grounded in essential intuitions, for example, of the classes of which

12

the perceived individual is a member.

We can infer that all bodies are

heavy only after feeling the weicht of several objects.

On the other

hand, we do not need the perception of several objects to tell us that
all bodies ere extended.

The foundation of this stvtemcnt is the

intuition of several essences.
•material

t~ing'

Having had intuitions of the essences

and •extension•, we are compelled to recognize that

the class •material thing' must be subordinated under the larger class
•extended thing•.
connected.
upon it.

The objects of these intuitions are necessarily

Induction differs from essential intuition and is founded

32

The intuition of a necessary connection between essences in our
example points to another difference between inriuction and essential
intuition that Husserl never fully articulates.
have an

uncondi~ioned

He says that the latter

generality while the former do not.

that eidetic judgments based on the

33

.
·this means

intuition of enough essences are

necessarily true, while inductive judgments besed on t:1e perception of
a reasonable number of individuaLs may not be true at all.

It is

standard procedure in the nature sciences to test a hypothesis by experimenting w::i.th individuals.

When enough experiments confirm the hypothesis

and none disconfirm it, then induction gives it the stetus of a natural
law until another hypothesis which explains the same facts more elegantly
can be established in the same inductive manner.

More experiments

increase the likelihood that a hypothesis is true.

But the possibility

that it is t"a.Lse always remains in spite of the most precise observations,
because of the restricted rane;e of things observed.

If at any time a

natural phenomenon "Violates" a natural law, then its lawfulness is annulled.

13

Laws of nature at best describe it.

They have no prescriptive power.

On

the other hand, an eiditic judgment based on the intuition of the essences
involved in the judgment nust be true.

It is no accident that the obser-

vation of real objects confirms its truth.

'fhe intuition of their essential

nature tells us that it could not be otherwise.
example, the essence

Because,

in Husserl's

'material thing' must be subordinated to the essence

•extended thing•, we will never find a material object which is not
extended in space.
Similarly essential intuition and formalization can be clearly
distinguished.

Phenomenology is not an inductive empirical science,

but it is not a formal deductive one either.
~ssential

intuition and formalization differ.in one respect.

Essential intuition allows us to see formal and

m~terial

essences,

while formalization allows us to see only those of the formal kind.
Formalization precludes individuals and classes which have individual
members.

Its lowest classes (infimae species) have no "material content."

34

'i'he generalization of material essences, on the other hand, does not.
uet us use Husserl's example of lived space to illustrate the difference
between formalization and the intuition of essences.

Formalization of
.

Spece produces an idea Which reduces Space to its Euclidean counterpart.

35

·::hen we treat lived space purely quanti ta ti vely and according to Euclid 1 s
rules, we abstract from some of its essential features.

Lived space,

for example, is full of colour; but a formalized idea of spcce does not
distinguish red from blue spe.ces.

Generalize.tion of space, on the other

hand, distinguishes coloured from uncoloured spaces, spec1fices sub-classes
of

co~oured

space

~i~e

red and

b~ue,

and offers yet more distinctions within

14
each sub-class.

36

Generalization and formalization are two species

of essential intuition.
of essences

Formalization is distinguished from the intuition

as a species is distinguished from its genus.
(3) Husserl•s Idea of a Descriptive bcience.

The intuition of essences is the foundation of the science of
phenomenology.

To reveal the scientific structure of phenomenology, we

must specify what his idea of a science is, end how he proposes to
construct a science upon his foundation.

His Logos essay, "Philosophy

as a Rigorous Science," published in 1911, remains the clearest articulation
of his scientific ideal.

Husserl contrasts his idea of philosophy as a

rigorous science with the kind of philosophy he calls a
(Wel tanschauung).

37

"world-view••

A true science, he says, has "scientific" foundations,

"scientific" problems, "scientific" methods, and there is a
logical harmony amongst the three of tnern.
Let us first examine Husserl•s idea

certain

38
of a scientific foundation.

The

foundation of a Weltanschauung is not the accomplishment of an individual
person.

lt has its roots in the cultural corununity or his time,

39

and its

fruits in the collective consciousness of his contemporaries who try to
persuade him that it ofrers an objectiviely valid view of the world.
neltanschauung philosophy has a social foundation.

40

It is offered to the

individual as a whole, and he must come to. terms with it in his lifetime.

41

'.1.'he steps of a truly scientific philosophy take it in the opposite
direc~ion.

individual.
Kind

01·

Its foundation is the
42

observa~ions

(Anschauungen) of the

As we have seen, the seeing of essences (Wesenschau) is the

Anschauung that Husserl's phenomenoloe;y is based on.

can add only modest building

.c.ach person

blocks to the structure of a science which must

15

always remain incomplete.
cor:rn:uni ty of scholars.
may

44

43

Finally, individual research

to a

lead~

The dynamics of the two philosophical tendencies

co-exist in the same person and in the same comraunity.

While naively

accepting much of his Weltanschauung, the scientific researcher continues
to construct "new fragments of strict doctrine" on the basis of his
observations.

Once in a while they may conflict, as for example the

Aristotelian

world-view and Galileo's "strict doctrines" did in the

seventeenth century.
Scientific problems also differ from those of a Weltanschauung.
latter are dictated

by a tradition.

Galileo's strict doctrines had to be

problematic for the world-view of his contemporaries.
research, on the other hand,

The

does not begin with a

Truly scientific

tradition~

but with a

dedication to the problems and the problematic demands stemming from them.
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Galileo dealt with the problematic nature of the moon, for example, by
observing it through a telescope.
demands to be observed.

Something with an observable nature

A scientific problem, then, is one which is allowed

to dictate the researcher's methods of investigation.

This is the source of

the loGiCal harmony which exists .between the problems and methods of a
science.
The methods of a science are dictated by the sense of its problems.
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The self-awareness required for the satisfaction of these demands
distinguishes scientific methods from those of a Weltanschauung.
The method of modern physics, for example, is hypothesis, followed by
experimental verification and induction from the results of the experiment.
On the other hand, no one could say exactly how he cot his world-view.

Husserl realizes that a self-reflective method is the oark of all sciences.
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"Every bit of completed science," he says, "is a whole composed of
thought-steps each of which is immedictely understood. 1147
Before Husserl's phenomenology can be recognized as the science he
claims it is, a harmony between its foundations and methods must be
discovered.

The exact nature of this harmony must be specified.
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Chap~er

II:

Methodology

Existentialism may be on the trail o:f more vital, more
frui.tful insights than pure phenomenology. But it has still
to lec:rn a few lessons from the older phenomenology,
particularly from· Husserl. one 01· these is the injunction
which I heard him address to an informal group of students
when he criticized Max Scheler's much more rapid, but not
equally solid production, "One needs bright ideas, but one
must not publish them." Another lesson is his insistence
on the need of making sure of the epistemological groundwork:
"One must not consider oneself too good to work on the
foundations." It is such lessons, °lessons of philosophical
solidity, in~ergity, and humanity, which both phenomenologists
and existentialists still have to learn or to relearn.
--Herbert Spiegelberg,
11
Husserl•s Phenomenology
and Sartre's Existentialism."
Phenomenology: The Philosophy
of Edmund Husserl and its
Interpretation, ed.
Joseph Kockelmans (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday and Co.,
1968), p. 266.
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If Husserl•s phenomenology is to be called a science,
all of

these characteristics:

it must exhibit

a foundation in the immediate intuition

of objects, a dedication to the demands stemming from the probletiatic
nature of the objects intuited, and a method dictated by the demanding
nature of its problems.

The foundation of phenomenology in the immediate

intuition of objects has alreedy been sufficiently illuminated.
A science must exhibit a dedi"cation to the demands stemming from
the problematic nature of its objects.

The natural sciences, geometry

mathematics, logic, each discipline must be sensitive to the object of
its own special interest.

Husserl says tha_t phenomenology supplies the

definitive criticism of every fundamentally distinct science, and in
particular, the determination of the sense in which their objects can
be said to be.

1

His distinction of objects into individuals, material

essences, and formal essences exhibits a dedication suited to this task.
What remains undetermined is the nature of the harmony between the
foundation and the methods of phenomenology.
Husserl's phenomenology can be called a

The question of whether

science will be decided by the

degree to which his method has become self-reflective.
Herbert Spiegelberg•s personal

memo~ies

of Husserl

indicate thet the

father of phenomenology was keenly aware of foundational problems, and
thet he did not consider himself too good to work on them.

It was likely

this feeling of humility thc.t prevented him from en-cering the promised
land of a phenomenological. phil_osophy.
to C:edicete his life to its ground',\ork.

He seer:is to have felt compelled
We

should expect him to have

done a considerable amount of work on the foundation of his method.
us see how he

articul~tes

.i..et

a theory of scientific method on the foundction
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o:f the intuition of essences.
(1) The Principle of All Principles.

·.L·he guiding question of this chapter is how Husserl can use the
intuition of essences as a methodological foundation.

Its usefulnecs is

described in the second c:1ap"ter of Ideas 1 under tne heading "the
principle of all principles" which Husserl expresses in the followint; manner:
primordial dator intuition is source of authority for knowledge ••• whatever presents itself in intuition in primordial
form ••• is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be,
though only v:i thin the limits in which it then pres en ts
itself ••• 1!.Very statement which does nothing more than give
expression to such date ••• is thus really an absolute beginning ••• a principium. But this holds. in special measure of
the essential judgements of this class that are general in
form, and it is t~ these that the term "principle" is
normally applied.
In this passage Husserl addresses the connection amongst intuitive,
reductive, and expressive endeavours.
intuitively given to consciousness,
what they appear to be.

He says that when objects are first
they are simply to be accepted for

Conversely they are not to be accepted as

anything they do not present themselves.as being.

The resulting

phenomenoloe,ical description is nothing more than an expression
"general in form" of what has been observed.
The first principle of Husserl's method is a two-fold injunction:
describe that which has been observed; do not speculate e.bout the unseen.
"Back to the things themselves!", the popular slogDn of Husserl's followers,
only expresses half of his first principle.

The foundation of phenomenology

as a science on the immediate intuition of objects really generates two
demands.

They, in turn, give rise to others.

Husserl's reductive project

should be interpreted as a technique for systematically anticipating and
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preventing all forms of
the dem8nd not

specul~tion.

Its vc.rious steps have their source in

to speculate about the unseen.

Similarly Husserl's descriptive

project and its various steps ere derived from the injunction to describe
everything that appears exactly as it presents itself.
Husserl's ability to derive both projects from his first principle of
method depends on its having a double nature.
incontrovertably different.

Its two demands must be

Otherwise the scientific nature of his

endeavour will not be appreciated.

Some of Husserl's interpreters,

J.M. Bochenski and Quentin Lauer for example, seem not to recognize the
difference between them or the correspondingly different reductive and
descriptive projects.

3

However, one philosopher who appreciates the

difference between Husserl's two principles and explains its methodological
importance is William James.
In his essay, "The Will to Believe", published in 1897, James
anticipates Husserl's first principle of method.

He approaches the

problem of religious belief by writing that there are:
two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion-ways entirely different, and yet we.ys about whose difference
the theory of knowledge see~s hitherto to have shown little
concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid error-these are our first and great commandments es would-be
knowers; but t:1ey a:re not two ways of st.<.·ting an identical
co::nmandment, they are t\•10 separate laws •••
Believe truth! Shun error! --these we see are two
mc:i.terially different laws; and by choosing bet\1een them we
may end by colouring difrerently our whole intellectual
life. ~'!e may rer;ard the chase for truth as p;;ramount and
the avoidc:nce of error as secondary; or we may ••• treat the
avoidnnze of error r,s more imperative, and let truth take its
chance.
IBoth James and Husserl

apprecie.te the real nature of the difference

roetween the deli.ends to know the truth snd to avoid error.

Both

21

philosophers recognize them as the first and most fundamental principles
of method.

The differences between the pragmatism of

J cimes

e.nd Husserl• s

phenomenolo[;y are ultimately due to the fact thet Jemes gave primacy
to the former, and !:fusserl

to the latter.

In his esse.y James argues

that in spite of the risk that it might be wrong, "we have the rii:;ht to
believe
5

wiJ.l. 11 "

at our own risk any hy:pothesis that is live enough to tempt our
Husserl, on the other hand, strove to est&-blish a philosophy

without presuppositions, and claimed for phenomenology the unique
function of criticizing all other sciences and itself at the S£cme time.

6

We may conclude from this thc.t there is a real difference between
the two demands of Husserl's first principle; that the two projects
stemming from them are really different; that the commandment not to
speculate about the unseen has priority over the

injunction to describe

what has been observed; and that the reductive project should precede
the descriptive one.

With the two projects sufficiently distinguished,

it now becomes possible to see how they a.re grounded in Husserl's first
principle.
(2) The Reductive Project.

Husserl's remarks about the famous reductions of phenomenology are
scattered throughout Ideas 1.

His reductions are techniques for anti-

cipating and preventing all forms of speculation.
from Husserl's desire to a_void error,

Even though they follow

their purpose is not purely negntive.

~esides

directing the philosopher away from speculation and its inevitoble

errors,

t~1ey

also point towards something else

transcendental subjectiVity.7
types of brackets.

Husserl calls

Husserl seems to mention four different

They are philoso,1hical, eidetic, phenomenolo2ical and
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transcendental.

But the transcendentaJ. and the

phenomenolo~ical

reductions are rea1ly the same one seen from two different points of view. 8
So, in

theory, there are really only

three different reductions.

Let

us examine them individually before trying to explain how they ere derived
from the commandment not to speculete about the unseen.
The philosophicel
briefly.

reduction is mentioned only once and then only

It leads the phenomenologist away from philosophical theories

and. points towards the observation of objects as they appear in intuition.
Philosophical. speculation about the ultimate source
unperceived enstence, etc. are eliminated.

of indiViduals,

9

their

t'hey are irrelevant to the

project of searching for the foundation of objective knowledge.

Husserl

thinks that this kind of reduction Will allow him to address his problems
outside of the tradition of philosophical speculation.
himself here as a

He seems to consider

scientific researcher separating himself as much as

possible from the Viel tanschauung of philosophy.

this reduction does not

mean that the phenomenologist is not allowed to speak of philosophy or to
entert£.in various philosophical theeries.

He must not, however allow

these theories to influence the description of what he has seen.
•rhe eidetic reduction also performs a negative and a positive task.

On

the negative side, ell reference to the individual and particular ere to
be omitted from phenomenolo[ical description after the eiditic reduction is
performed.

10

~peculations

about the e:ti.stence, the source, and the

eXistentia1 stetus of universals are eliminated.

Positively cons1dered,

this reduction specifies the kind of intuited object whic£1 shou!d receive
special. attention.

Phenomenological description may start with the

observation or imagination of individuals, but thereafter should concentrate
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on the intuition of essences.
Eiditic reduction is absolutely essential to phenomenology because it
1s the operation that distinguishes it from British empiricism.

Hume,

for example, says that simple ideas are caused by simple impressions
which they faintly copy.

11

Husserl, on the other hand, is unalterably

opposed to any theory which fails to recognize that the object of perception
and the object of ideation differ, not in degree, but in kind.
and essences are different kinds of.things.
that their difference is recognized.

Individuals

The eiditic reduction ensures

Spiegelberg would say that Hume and

anyone else refusing to make the eiditic reduction commit what he calls the
sense-orgsn fallacy:
Another obstruction to an open-eyed approach
to the phenomena might be called the senseorgan bias. It could be formulated as a
principle: nothing is to be recognized as a datum
unless it can be assigned to a specific sense
organ (in the biological .organism) as its
receptor. A good many positivistic rejections
of phenomenological data, such as the denial of
distance perception, may well be y~cribed to
some such negativistic prejudice.
Hume's copy theory of ideas is a good illustration of the sense-organ
fallacy.

It asks us

to believe th8t each of our simple ideas copies

one of our impressions and therefore can be assigned to a specific
sense organ.

This kind of

"empiricism" also impoverishes our experience

by sug£esting that each of our impressions of the world we live in

has its own proper sense organ.

13

British empiricism fails to recognize

the rich diversity of the kinds of human
objects.

knowledge 8lld their various

Husserl will settle for nothing less than a theory of knowledge

Which recognizes the intuition of essences.
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Finally the phenomenoloeical reduction, much like the other ones,
performs a dual purpose.

After its applicetion there should be no more

reference even to the essence of intuited objects.

14

The phenomenological

reduction ensures that intuited essences will not be reified, hypostatized,
or spoken of as if they had substantial existence apart from anyone who
classifies individuals or formalizes their relationships.

The phenomenologist

must not clai::i th.st essences are anything more than intuition presents them
to be.

The ultimate reduction refers the phenomenologist away from objects

and towards transcendental subjectivity or the stream of consciousness
is supposed to be the ultimate goal of phenomenology.

~hich
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The reductive project of Husserl's philosophy, as a systematic attempt
to anticipate and avoid aJ.l types of speculation, is grounded in the
methodological principle which demands that there should be no speculation
about the unseen.
~eduction
~f

Husserl's first principle of method calls for the

of theories to individuals, of

indi~duals

to essences, and

essences to the stream of consciousness in which they are constituted.

"he reductive project is systematic in the sense that the philosophical
~pokhe

.

should be applied first, followed by the eiditic, and finally the

phenornenoloQ.cal reductions.

When properly understood, the reductive

lroject is seen to be a propadeutic to the descriptive one.
(3) The Descriptive Project.
Husserl shuns error by refusing to speculate about that which he
cannot see.
as far

i=!S

His first principle also demands tnet he should seek the truth

he can by d0scribing thin;;s a.s they appear to him.

thece demands also generates a

The second of

complete project involVing several operations.

If Husserl's descr~ptive methods are as scientific as his reductive
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techniques, each operi:;tion must be distinct from the others, and all of them
must

have their foundation in the intuition

of objects.

Let us first distinguish each operetion of the descriptive project
in the same way tilat Husserl would.

In a section of I de as 1 entitled

"The Heference o.f Phenomenology J:3ack to its Own Self, 11 Husserl says
that phenomenology:
has to place before its own eyes as ins~ances certain
pure conscious events, to bring these to complete
clearness, and within this zone of clearness to subject
them to analysis and the apprehension of their essences,
to follow up the essential connections that can be clearly
understood, to grasp what is momentarily perceived in
conceptual expressions, of which the meaning is prescribed
purely by the object perceived or in some way transparently
understood. 16
The five techniques of which Husserl speaks can be distinguished and
elaborated in the following way:
(1)

Individual pure consciousness events (i.e., intuitions of objects)

are to be regarded as instantiations of essences (that is, as members
of cle.ssesJ.
(2)

The class memberships of each individual are to be made completely

clear and distinct.
noticed.

(Anything clearly presented to consciousness can be

'l'hings distinctively presented are so noticeable that they

cannot be confused with
(3)

anything else.)

Each clee.rly and distinctly presented essence tor class) is to be

apprehended.
(4)

The noticeable connections amon.gst intuited essences \i.e. the

subordination of a species to its genus) should be followed up
\i.e., to their highest genus).
( 5)

The foregoing

intuitions and their objects should be described
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"in faithful conceptual expressions" exactly as they have presented
themselves.
There are five distinct techniques, four of them involving intuition, and
one of them the expression of what has been intuited.
doubt that each of the five

i~

'l'here can be no

different.

The last and most crucial of these techniques deserves special attention.
Having overcome

one kind of positivism with its eidetic reduction, 11usserl 1 s

phenomenology must not fall victim to another.

There is an empirical

positivism of which the philosophy of David Hume is a good example.
According to its te:iets, intuition only of individual objects is possible,
and then only those which cmi be assigned to a specific sense-organ in the
biolocical org.onism as its receptor.

Against this kind of positivism

Husserl maintains that we have intuitions of essences as objects which
differ in kind from individual ones,
possible to see.

and which eidetic reauction makes it

But there is also a positivism of expression whose basic

assumptions are that discursive language is the only means of expression,
and that anything which cannot be expressed discursively is meaningless.
Suzanne Langer attributes this kind of positivism to Bertrand Russell,
Rudolph Carnap and some other analysts of language.

18

From their point of

View, the various arts say nothing which discursive language cannot say
"!:letter, and anything Vlhich resists

tr~mslation

is meaningless.

Because

this doctrine impoverishes the realm of expression in much the same way that
Hume's sense-organ fallacy impoverishes the empirical one, we could call
it the fallacy of impoverishing expression.

There are other varieties of

"f ai thful conceptual expressions" besides "judgments general in form." 13

\':e must expand our notion of expression to include all of them, for instence,
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the musical expression of Beethoven's Nint:1 Symphony, or the poetic
ression of James Joyce's novel Ulysses.

ex-

But that is not a project we can

undertake here.
For our purpose it will be sufficient to say in general that
the expression of what has been seen, along with the intuitive parts of the
descriptive project, must be grounded in the demand to describe things
exactly as they present themselves for observation.

After individuals

are perceived or imagined, it becomes possible to concentrate on their
essences or class memberships.
can be recognized.

When these become

sufficiently clear, .they

Then essential connections can be recognized amongst

them.

Finally it becomes possible to describe everything that has been

seen.

Each step in the descriptive ptoject is founded on the insightfulness

of the step which preceded it.

All of them have their ultimate foundation

in the intuition of objects.
For a complete view of Husserl's theory

~f

method, the relationship

between reductive and descriptive projects must be outlined,

Each reduction

is a section of the handrail that helps us up the stairs of insight one
step at a time.

The philosophical reduction makes the intuition of objects

possible by eliminatine speculations about them.

The eidetic reduction

makes the intuition of essences and essential connections possible by
putting the uniqueness of individuals into brackets.

Finally the

phenomenological reduction makes the description of intuited objects
possible by eliminating reference to anything beyond the stream of
consciousness.
The examination of Husserl's theory of method has established that,
theoretically, his method deserves to be called scientific. Husserl seems
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highly aware of what he is doing when he spe<'.k.S of the pre.ctices of
phenomenology.

His theory of phenomenological method can be re-constructed

on the be.sis of his principle of principles.

Theoretically,

there is

a certain harmony between the foundc.tions and methods of phenomenology.
It remains for us to discover

~hether

Husserl's philosophy is actually

as scientific as his theory o·f me-chod represents it to be.

Let us see

how near husserl has been able to approach his promised land.
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Chapter III:

Method

If this procedure in its unsophistica~ed form serves
at first only to mc-..ke one at home in a ne'l'i doI!lein,
to practice seeing, apprehending, analyzing generally
within it and to encourage some acquaintance with its
data, ~then) scientific reflection upon the essential
nature of the tyPes of presentation which play their
part within it, upon essence, performance, conditions
of complete clearness and insight, as well as of
completely true and steady conceptual expression,
and more of the same kind, undertakes the function
of a general and logicelly rigorous metncdic
grounding. Followed up deliberately, it te.kes
on the character and rank of scientific method;
and this in any given case, in the application of
rigorously formulated methodic standards, per~its
of the practice of a limiting and improving
criticism.
-Edmund Husserl
Ideas 1, p. 174

•
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Husserl's phenomenological method, as he aescribes it, cDn be diVided
into two different projects

~nd

their guiding principle.

all principles is the injunction not to speculate
but only to describe that which can be seen.
three and the source of the other two.

'l'he principle

of

about the unobservable,

It is the most elemental of the

Secondly, the graded t-educti.Ol\ is

supposed to eliminate the possibility of speculation with the result tha_t
the phenomenologiEt • s eyes are directed towards something which ce_n be
observed.

·.1:he descriptive project is an attempt to clarify and describe

exactly what is there to be seen.
not only does Husserl's methodology

prescrib~

a definite order in the

use of principles and projects, it also suggests a further order in the steps
of each of them.

'l'he principle of principles comes first:

impetus for all phenomenolog:ical endeavour.

it provides the

·1·he reductive project should

follow since nothing can be observed and described before it has been
pointed out.

Finally

whatever is seen can be described.

'l'he graded reduction consists of a series of reductions which are
meant to follow eachother in a definite order.
observed unless

he disregards theories

unperceived existence, etc.
the philosophical reduction.

Individual objects cannot be

about their ultimate source, their

tlusserl calls the exclusion of these theories
!~or

can the common essence of individuals be

discerned before their uniqueness is eliminated from consideration.
elimine.tion of individuality :i:'.usserl calls the eiditic reduction.

·1·he
J.n order

to describe the common fe;;tures discerned, the phenooenologist must restrain
himselr frot1 speekine; about anything more thccn the constitution of objects
in th,; streexa of consciousness.

Husserl ce.lls chis type of restraint

phenomenological or transcendental. It seems that the philosophical reduction
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should be followed by the eidecic which should be followed by the
phenomenologicol one.
Simile.rly, Husserl's injunction to d!scribe that which can be seen
prescribes a definite order in the five steps of the descriptive project.
An individual. should be observed first.
and analysed.

Its presence may then be clarified

• clearly and distinctly presented, its
When it has been

essential features will reveal themselves.

Then they can be observed.

Then the individual.may reveei itself as essentially connected to other
individuals.

This too should be noticed.

express everything which has been seen.

Finally the observer should accurate
Any variqtion in the order of steps

would destroy their insightfulness since eaeh of them builds on the insight
of the step which preceded it.
Although we may construct a complete theory of method on the basis of
Husserl's scattered methological remarks in Ideas 1, we cannot be sure of
our interpretation until we verify that the intentions of this theory are
actually fulfilled in practice.
procedure
home in

Husserl says apologetically that his

in its unsophisticeted form may serve at first only to make us at
the phenomenological domain; but that if we think deliberately about

what he has done, we may be able to understand,

limit, and improve his

techniques.
Let us make ourselves at home with Husserl's techniques for dealing
With the problem of objective knowledge.
those of the

obj~cts

Let us sub-divide the problem into

of perception, the world in which they are perceived to

eXist, and the other people in the world who perceive them.
fQ~iliarizing

problems, we

After

ourselves with his phenomenological treatment of these
m~y

be able to point out some of its limitations and perhaps
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even suggest a few improvements.
(1) The object of perception
"We perceive things."
problems of philosophy.
something?

This simple claim engenders one of the perennial

What do we mean by the expression "to perceive"

What do we mec:n by so.ying that "somet.•ing" is perceived?

The history of philosophy bears witness to the difficulty of these questions.
They have been approached from idealistic end realistic points of view.
Both schools of thought have "explained" what an object of perception is
and how we come to know such a thing.
profusion of thought.

But philosophy is embarrassed by this

Because the competing

11

explanetions" are imcompatible

with each other, a doubt is cast upon both of them.

If Husserl's phenomeno-

logical approach can cut this Gordian knot, the ground will have been
cleared for genuine understanding.
of his Ideas 1 where he does the

I propose to examine the fourth chapter
groundwork:.

1

But firsi; t.he problem should be given an historical context.

Its

formal statement is too vague to serve a philosophical purpose.
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) will serve to illustrate the realistic position,
and George Berkeley (1685-1753) the idealistic one.
(i) Descartes on the problem.
Two questionable ste.tements about the object of perception may be
derived from the philosophy of Rene Descertes.

One is metaphysical; the

other is part of a theory of knowledge.
According to Desc0rtes•

Medit~tions

on First Philosonhy (published

1641) we do not directly acquaint ourselves ~~th an object through our
senses.

Descartes tries to verify this claim by

he hris taken freim a beehive.

2

ex~unining

a piece of wax

It is sweet-tasting, smells of flowers,
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feels hard and cold; when struck, it emits a sound; and it hes a definite
shape.

These perceptions compel him at first to think that the piece of

wax is a sweet tasting,
definitely

sh~ped

flowery smelling, hard, cold, sound emitting,

object.

But after moving the piece of wax towa.rds his fireplace, he finds
that is has become a tastless, odourless, hot fluid which cannot be struck
to produce a sound in the way that it formerly could; it seems to be an
indefinitely shaped puddle.

Descartes• senses tell him that what he sees now

differs completely from what he had noticed beiore,

And yet, not unsurpris-

ingly, he knows that he is looking z.t the same pie.ce of wax.
Descertes draws a conclusion from his meditation on the wax, one which
no one would doubt or disagree with.

An object perceived to be cor:1pletely

different is nevertheless known to be the same.

From this indubitable

fact Descartes concludes:
I must therefore admit that I cannot by way of images
comprehend what this wax is, and that it by the mind
alone that I (adequately) apprehend it ••• \'ihat was
especially to be noted is that our (adequate)
apprehension of it is not a seeing, nor a touching,
3
nor an imaging••• but is solely an inspection of the mind •••
bodies a re not cognized by the senses or by the
imagination, but by the understen.ding alone. 4
Desc~rtes

believes that consciousness does not reach out to its objects

throug·h our senses or imagination; only e.bstract thought unmixed with
sensc.tions or images can reveel their true nature.
The metaphysical corollary of Descartes' epistemolobicoJ. doctrine is
th.::1t perceiv2ble qualities are not real properties of an
to him, objects appear to have simple and complex propert
the simples (extension and other mathematical properties)
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perceive should be attributed to theobject as it is in itself.

Speaking

of the objects we seem to perceive, Descartes claims that:
they are not perhaps exactly such as we apprehend by
way of the senses; in many instances they are
apprehended only obscurely and confusedly. But we must
at least admit that whatever I there clearly and
distinctly apprehend, ie; generally speaking,
everything comprised in the object of5pure
mathematics, is to be found in them •••
sensuous apprehensions have been given me by nature
only as testifying to my mind what things are
beneficial or harmful ••• For this they are •••
sufficiently clear and distinct. But what I have done
is to use them as rules sufficiently reliable to be
employed in the immediate determination of the essence
of bodres external to me; a nd as so employed, their
testimony cannot be other than obscure and confused. 6
It seemed to Descartes that the

absolute clarity and distinctness of simple

mathematical properties mark them as real properties of an object; only
pure mathematics can be used to determine exactly what a given object is.
vescartes thought thet the other properties of objects, those which we
perceive,

merely indicate the effect

an o_bJect has on us.

·1•hey too appear

clearly and distinctly; but only sufl'icien-cly so as to determine whether the
perceived object can benefit or harm the perceiver.
'l'he property wmch best illustrates Descartes' metaphysical doctrine
is prob&oly the sweet taste of the

wax.

He would likely have argued that

its sweet taste indicates the possible presence of something beneficial.
But the nourishing benefit we may gatierfrom it is something distinct from
its tastiness which merely points to our needs and their possible
satisfaction.

The taste of the wax therefore does not reveal anything

essential about its nature.
Descartes sought to make it possible for modern science to describe
natural

objects by means only of pure mathematics.

His search ended with
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these metaphysical and

epistemolo~ical

doctrines:

only mathematical

properties are real qualities of an obejct; we become acquainted with them
only by mea ns of abstract thought.

On the other hand, sensible qualities

are not real properties of an object; and we cc:.nnot directly acquaint
ourselves with an object through our senses.
distinction between mathematical and

Cartesian realism, With its

complex sensible qualities,

has ever since the time of Descartes enjoyed the same degree of prestige
and popularity as modern science itself.
(ii) Berkeley on the problem
The idealistic philosophy of George Berkeley 1 Bishop of Cloyne, was
unlike Descartes' in that it attracted no following.
it attracted hardly even any criticsl attention.

Indeed, at first

Nevertheless his

metaphysical and epistemologicel doctrines and their supporting arguments
present the greatest problem for Descartes in particular and the philosophy
of science in general, for a ccording to Berkeley, a perceivable object is
nothing more than the

sum of its sensible qualities; therefore, we acquire

knowledge of an object only through our senses.
Berkeley tried to support his claims through several different lines
of argument.

The most important of these may be found in his Three

Dialogues Between Hylas and

Philonous (published 1713), a work he was

careful to preface with a warning against the "common principles of
philosophers" who would teach us to distinguish the "real nature" of things
from "that which falls under our senses".

From

this distinction,,

he sutgests, arises nothing but scepticism and paradox.

7

One of his

declered purposes in writing the Dialogues is to return men from these
pci.radoxes to their natural attitude.

He clai:ns to be the spokesrwn for
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common sense.

8

At first both Hylas and Philonous seem to express common sense Views
as they agree that sensible th±ngs are "nothing else bui; so many sensible
qualities or combinations of sensible qualities. 119

Hylas, however, Will not

agree to the additional 3erkeleyan Vieu

(proposed by Philonous) that sensible

qualities are nothing but "ideas in the

mind" because he thinks that it

endangers "the reality of sensible thincs".
attempts to avoid the
}'irst he
some

Consequently he makes two

d~nger.

tries to distinguish amongst sensible qualities, se.ying that

are really properties of an object while

oth~rs

are not:

sensible qualities are by philosop hers diVided into
primary and secondary: The former are extension; figure,
solidity, gravity, motion, and rest, and these they hold
exist really in bodies. ~he latter are; •• all sensible
qualities beside the primary; which they assert are only
so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the
mind. 10
It is significant that the qualities liylas wants to attribute to the objects
of perception tend to be mathematical ones.

The tendency he expresses here

approaches the meta physics of modern science.

But he cannot think of an

adequate reply to Philonous who argues that perceived extension and all
other primary qualities of an object vary with the position and condition
of the perceiver as much as the secondary ones do.
exa1;~ple,

Philonous argues, for

that the object of perception grows or diminishes in size as

the observer approaches or retreats from it.

11

Perspectival variations

in the size of a perceived object are subjective, nothing but "ideas
in the mind."
Finally fiylas can see no other alternative than to withdraw .from the
orJ.ginal

.ac;reement that sensible things .e.re nothing more than the sum of
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their sensible qualities:
It has just come into my head, Philonous, that I have
somewhere heard of a disr.inction between absolute and
sensible extension. Now though it be acknowledged that
great snd small, consisting merely in the relation
which other extended bein£S hiwe to the parts of our own
bodies, do not re8lly inhere in the substances
themselves. Yet nothing oblig~~ us to hold the same with
reg;:rd to absolute extensi on.
Similarly he distinguishes absolute from perceivable motion and suggests
that the sEme distinction should be applied to the other primary qualities
of an object.

Hylas• distinction results in the idea of an object not

only as something more, but as something completely other than its
sensible queiities.

It is now completely mathematical.

There is no longer

any difference between his concept of an object and Descartes•.

This

dis-i;inction amongst qualities is not unlike the one Newton ( 1642-1'/27 J
makes in his Mathematical Principles of Ne,tural Philosophy (published
1687). l3

Let us now examine what is
that an

probably Berkeley's strongest argument

ooject is nothing more than that which falls under our senses.

14

'l'he follo\7ing line of resoning can be abstracted from Beriteley• s diaJ.ogue form:
(1)
( 2)
c.3)

SuPPRESSED
( 4)

SuPPRESSED(5)
SuPPRESSED(6)
(7)
(8)

Extended objects can be divided into parts.
They are divisible if and only if their parts can be
distinguished from each other.
Distinctions amongst parts are made possible
by something sensible
(and extended).
Absolute extension is insensible.
Extended objects are absolutely extended or they are not.
If they are, they are not divisible into parts, (by 2 and 3)
But extended objects are divisible into parts.
Therefore it is impossible to think that absolute
extension is a property of extended objects.

After being led to this conclusion

by Philonous,

Hylas

claimo that he has

not had enough time to think about fallacies they may have committed while
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argµing..

But we c.:n be sure that Berkeley means to present an irrefutable

chain of thoueht.

In arguments such as this one, Berkeley

problems in the pholosophy of science.

presented great

The argument suggests not only that

extended objects could heve no parts if they were

.absolutely extended,

but also that there could be no inc.iYidual objects!
none of them could be divided from the rest.

In absolute space·,

Re concludes that the

extension of perceivable objects is nothing more than.
sensible qualities;

~as

the sum of its

and he would certainly have wanted to say that the

same holds true for the rest of its prim!q'y qualities.
Because of his doctrine that an object of

per~eption

is the sum .

of its sensible qua,.lities, Berkeley believed that "sensible things are
only to be perceived by sense or represented by the imagination .n
Now we find that the
produced a stalemate.
change:

ar~uments

15

of Berkeley and Descartes have

Berkeley cannot cope with Descartes' argument from

if an extended object (i.e., a piece of wax) is no ·more than

the sum of its sensible qualities, and if all the ones it has at a given
moment are replaced by others, then the result must be a different object.
But the same

object remains.

an object is the

Therefore it must be wrong to suppose that

sum of its sensible qualities.

Nor could Descartes have

responded to Berkeley's argument from the divisibility of objects:

if an

extended object is something more than thet which falls under our senses
(i.e., if it is absolutely extended), and if anything insensible is
indiVisible, then extended objects cannot be divided into. parts. But
extended objects can be divided into parts.

Therefore it must be wrong to

suppose that extended objects do not fall under our senses.

If both men

have argued rightly, then their contradictory theses Vitiate each other and
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a valid concept of the object is impossible.
(iii) Husserl's Solution
The fourth chapter of Husserl's Ideas 1 begins with the announcement
the possibility

of his bracketing technique has yet to be established.

t~1.::,t

16

He claims to be involved in the general project of explaining what is
means to be conscious of

something.

17

The

examples he uses to illustrate the

ossibility of reduction in his project are his perception of a piece of
paper on the table

in front of him, a.nd his perception of the table itself. 18

His choice of examples involves him in Descartes' and Berkeley's problem.
Although Husserl's operations in chapter·four·correspond roughly
to his theory of method, they are in some respects at variance with one
another.

The first principle of method is not to speculate about the

unknown, but only to describe what can be seen.

His description of

consciousness is an exact application of the rule telling him to describe
what he can see.

But it also calls for the suppression of speculative

theories before anything is described; and in Husserl's own words, "we
start with

a series of observations within which we are not troubled with any

phenomenological epokhe."

19

he began his description.

He did not explicitly bracket anything before

We shall reconsider this methodological problem

after verifying his theory of description.
According to Husserl's theory of phenomenological description,
consciousness of something

should be described in five steps.

appee.r in the following order:

They should

first the observation of indi·:idual

conscious events, followed by the clarification and analysis of what has been
observed, the apprehension of their essence, the following up of their
essential connections, and

finally the exact description of everything that
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has been seen.
Husserl begins by describing his experience of a piece of paper, "in
its pure singularity"

20

He distinguishes the cogitatio (perceptual e:xperience)

from the cogitatum lthing perceived).
front of him.

The piece of paper lay on the table in

Around and about it were books, pencils, and an ink well.

His perceptual experience, on the other hand, was a "turning towards"
it, a

"singling out" from the background of other objects; his perception

of the paper had "a

zone of background

intuitions."

The paper was

singled out by "a free turning of the loolt," whereupon his perception of
the paper was transferred from a non-actual consciousness to an actual
orientation, from dormancy to wakefulness.
ference occurs as a "stream of experience."

Husserl sees that the trans•
This observation completes

the .analysis of his perception.
Closer

eXB.!nination reveals that the singular characteristics of

Husserl's perception of a piece of paper also belong to other modes of
consciousness.

We are similBJ"lY aware .of things in memory, imagination,

expectation, and in various other ways.

Husserl observes that in spite

of all variations in modes of consciousness, "all that we nave stated
concerning perceptual experiences holds good, obViously of these other
experiences, essentially different

e.s

they are. 1121

Therefore, the singling

out, the figure on a background, the free turning of the look, the dormancyWakefulness structure, and the s'tream of experience are essential.
structures of consciousness.
l-urther variations of consciousness establish that it is essentially
connected to something.
out from a background,

When Husserl turned towards something, singling it
he was aware of an object.

"It belongs as a general
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feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of
something. 1122
was

But when he was no longer actually

aware of it, when it

present only in the background of something else he had turned towards,

he was still conscious of the same thing; only then he we.s a.ware of it in
a different way.

Consciousness of an object survives VGxiations from actual

to non-actual modes of consciousness.
related to an object.

Therefore consciousness is essentially

Husserl calls this property its intentional

hi p • 23
.
.re 1 a t ions

.r·urther descriptive efforts establish that the essencial connections
between perception and the object perceived is not. yet clear enough to be
followed up.

Husserl asks what we mea.'l when we sey

(as Descartes did)

that perception and extended objects each have their own essence; he asks
how they can be cognitively interwoven if they are different.

And finally

he asks whether perception and thinghood (as Berkeley asserted) share
.
24
any thi ng in common.

Husserl tries three times to reply to his questions:

first from the natural _point of view, _then as modern scientist; final.J.y
he succeeds when the

application;·~of

phenomenoloeical standpoint.
sibili ty

brackets allows him to take the

Presu::1ably his success illustretes the pos-

of, and the proper place for, the epokhe in phenomenological

description.
Husserl tries to observe and describe. the esse:lce of perceptual
intention while remaining in the natural standpoint.

However, perception

appears only to be an empty essenceless looking-towards an object full of
properties with which it comes into contact in some astonishing way.
l'he natural -standpoint has earlier exhausted its material.

25

There is

nothing to be discovered about the ini.:entiona lity of consciousness from

--42

this point of view.

Its failure signals the need for a new app·roach.

ausserl tries to carry on the description from t!1e v:tewpoin-c
of moderu science by distinguishing the object of perception from the
object of physics.

<:hile the object of perception has sensible qu&li ties

and is esc.entially connected to consciousness in some mysterious way through
them, the physical object is qualified by atomic elements, ions, energies,
end space-fillinG processes which can oe approached only by means of
mathematical expressions.

26

~he perceived object in sensible space is

only a sign of the true thing, the physical object.
space is to be

distingui~hed

Likewise, perceivable

from, and recognized ·as only a sign of,

the mathematical space studied by.modern physics.

27

The distinction, however, does not prove to be an illuminating
one.

The relationship between perception and its object remains mysterious.

And.now the real object is thought to. be even more remote from perceptual
consciousness.

We are confronted by the additional problem of the

relationship between the object of perception and the object of physics.
And the question of the connection between pure methematical reasoning .
and the physical object also

remains unanswered.

Husserl seeks to win a deeper insight into the intentionality
of consciousness through the technique of phenomenological reduction.
sibility
eVident.

Its pos-

in the project of describing the awareness of objects soon becomes
The application of brackets means thet:
we shut off the Ylhole of physics and the whole
domain of theoretical thoue;ht. We rem8in within
the framework of plain intuition and the
·
28
syntheses that belong to it, including perception.

Although this passage stresses the eliminc•tion of the

theoretic~l

object

43

studied by modern physics, we should not allov1 its

er.:~ihasis

to overshadow

the fact that all other theories of the object are also elimineted.
apparently, can we address even the object of perception.

29

Nor,

Husserl says that

we can only observe the framework of intuition and the syntheses that belong
to it.
Al though it seems that r'elation to an object cannot be described
within these limits, this is precisely whet Husserl does.

He constructs a

framework by rising and walking around the table at which he was seated.
By keeping it steadily in

view as he walks around it, he finds that his

perception of the table never stops changing.
changing perceptions,

30

It is a continuum of

or as he has said before, a stream of experience.

Nevertheless he knew th&t the table remained the table:
Only the table is the same, known as identical
through the synthetic consciousness which
connects the new perception with the
recollection.31
ttusserl' s circular framework of intuition establishes the identity of the
table through syntheses of perception and.recollection.

The same synthesis

which produces a continuum of changing perceptions also produces awareness
of an object which appears with ever increasing compl.eteness.
is known to be continuously the same while

~usserl 1 s

changes, it r.iust be something more than "idea
Even if

Since the ta.ble

perception continually

in the mind."

Berkeley was right to think that an object is nothing more

than the sum of its sensible qualities, he was wrong to think thE,t they are
purely subjective.

By extending the

sa-~'e

c2.reful description to the colour

of the tEJble, Husserl proves they are not.
The perceived ti.:ing in general, and all its parts,
aspects, and phases, whe~her tile quality be primary
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or secondary, nre necessarily transcendent to the
perception, and on the same grounds everywhere. The
colour of the thing seen is not in principle
a real ph~se of the consciousness of colour;
it appears, but even while it is appearing
the appeerance can e.nd must be continually
changing, as experience shows. -rhe same colour
appears in continuounly varying patterns of
perspective colour variations. Similarly for 32
every sensory quality and every spatial shape!
Since the sensible properties of

an object can also be known t·o remain the

same while our perception of them veries, Berkeley was wrong to argue thet
sensible quaJ.ities are purely subjective.
Berkeley's argument that a perceived object grows or diminishes
as an observer approaches or retreats from it exhibits a fundamental error
in theory of perception.

If we wanted to give it a name, we might call it

the fallacy of confusing a perspected variable with its perspectival
variations.

Husserl .explains very clearly the difference between the

two:
We must keep this point clearly before our eyes,
that the sensory data which exercise the function
of presenting colour, smoothness, shape, and so
forth perspectivally ••• differ wholly and in
principle from colour, smoothness, shepe •••
The perspective VE.riation is en experience. But
experience is possible only as experience, and
not as something spatial. 'l'he perspected vc:.riable,
however, is in principle possiole only as spatial
(it is indeed spatial in its essence), but not
possible as experience. 33
Secondary or sensible qualities of an object belong to it, not to
consciousness.

Like the object they belong to, they ere given in experience,

but differ in principle lrom it.

Failure to distinguish between tI1em can

only end in paradox and scepticism.
It is no let:s a fundamental error to suppose, as Descorl;es did,
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that perception fails to come into contact with the thing itself.

Husserl

sheds some light on this fundamental error when he observes thc:.t perception
of an object is not an image or a sign of its presence.

34

·,'i'e collapse

into nonsense when we confuse these different maces of presentation.

The

perce})tion of things does not present something that is not present.

There

is nothing li. e., no sign vehicle) medie.ting consciousness and its object.
We do not observe two things,

a sign vehicle and its meaning.

.:e are

simply aware of an obJect, only one thing.
(iv) Husserl's Method
l1usserl 1 s description addresses itself to
problem with no small measure of success.

ver~eley•s

and Descartes•

He has established (contra

Berkeley) that experience and its object are essentially dif1'erent, and
(contra Descartes, that they are intentionally rele.ted.
Husserl's search for the essence of consciousness follows his theory of
description

fairly

close~y.

theory of reductions.

But his use of brackets seems to repudiate his

Nor on the basis of ghet he has done can we sa:y that

the relationship which is supposed to hold between the reductive and
descriptive projects has been completely verified.
Husserl says that consciousness is essentially related to an object.
He took five steps to reach this conclusion.
perception of a piece of paper.
singularity.
follow.

He reflected upon his

He observed the perception in its pure

Theoretically, its clerificntion and analysis are supposed to

First he analysed it, distinguishing several structural elements.

After verying his modes of consciousness of the paper

and discovering that

the same structural elements persisted, he concluded th:..t they belong to the
essence of consciousness.

'~'he

observction of essential connections required
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a special effort.

Husserl concluded that consciousness is essentially

connected to an object only after observing that it persists throughout the
various parts of a structure.
their connection.

Then he specified the synthetic nature of

Lastly, and not without some rhetorical clumsiness,

he recorded everything he saw.
His apparent use of brackets fails to correspond with his theory of
bracketing.

Theoretically, there are philosophical, eidetic, and

phenomenological reductions; and they should be applied in the order
demanded by the principle of principles.
Closer examination of

Husserl's method revea1s

that although he

mentioned only the phenomenological reduction by name, he seemed to use
the other two as well.

Their use,

prescribed by his theory.
reduction.

however, does not follow the order

First he seemed to make use of the eidetic

He reflected upon his perception of a piece of paper in

its pure singularity.

But his analysis of that pure conscious event is

expressed in general terme which could apply equally well to other modes
of consciousness.

His description does not have special reference to the

unique historical event of Husserl perceiving a piece of paper.

Since

special reference to the individual is precisely what is eliminated by
the eidetic reduction, we must conclude from this that Husserl has
covertly made use of it.
Secondly, the phenomenological epokhe mentioned and used just before
.i-Iusserl' s final descriptive effort conceale two sepD.re.te reductions.

He

used it to eliminate all metaphysicol theories about the object of
perception and its properties.
"philoso!Jhical reduction"

Earlier in Ideas 1 he gRve the name

to this usage.
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.After refusing to address any
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theories of the object, he also refused to address the intentional object.
Instead he proposed to dec,cribe only the framework of his intuitona
The latter refusal is an instance of phenomenological bracketing.
appecrs that,

of it.
So it

a.11 three reductions have been used, they were not applied

in the order theoretically prescribed.
Furthermore, Husserl 1 s last reducticn

bears e, disquieting resemblance

to an operetion which occurs at the very beginning of his project.

After

distinguishing his perception of a paper from the paper he perceived, he
excluded the paper from further consideration.

Are we not bound to consider

this also as an application of phenome:!ological brackets?

If so, then the

theoretical order of the brackets has been completely reversed, the
phenomenological one being used first, the eidetic next,followed by the
phiLosophical, and then the phenomenological brackets again.
Theoretically,

the application of brackets shouJ.d precede

phenomenological description.

Contrary to theory, Husserl claims to have

made a series of observations without troubling himself with the phenomenological epokhe.

How can theory and practice he reconciled?

The

principle of all principles directs the phenomenologist not to speculate
about the unseen, but only to describe what he has observed.

Since this law

should be applied to every st'ep in llusserl's descriptive procedure, we have

eood reason to think each of his observations is preceded by a reduction
of some sort.
In spite of his claim to the contrary, he does seem to .:ipply brackets
before each observation.
in the way thet llusserl rs
Should.

~.usserl;s

;Jut observations and brackets <lre not coupled
theory of method leads us

to believe that they

excluoive preoccup;::tion with the pure conscious event
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of his perception presupposes the exclusion of the thing perceived.

His

earliest observction must nave been preceded by a phenomenological
reduction, not the philosophical one his theory seems to require.
Secondly, the analysis of his purely singular act of perception
iS expressed in
consciousness.

general terms which apply equally well to other modes of
Furthermore, even when applied to perception,

have special reference to the
perceiving the paper.

~inc&

tl1ey do not

unique historical event of Husserl
the eidetic reduction eliminates special

reference to the individual, it is safe to conclude that Husserl's
analysis presupposes it.
Theoretically, the eidetic reduction is supposed to precede and
make possible the intuition of essences.

But actually, it has preceded and

made possible the analysis of a perception, albeit in general terms.
its analysed elements are recognized as essential to consciousness only
after surviving variations in its modes.

If the eidetic brackets have

made the intuition of essences possible, it is the variation in modes of
consciousness which made it possible for them to be recognized as such.
Finally Husserl is able to follow up the essential connection
between consciousness and its

object only after performing philosophical

and phenomenological reductions.

Although the situation seems to call

for the suspension of essences not essentially relctted to eachother,
Husserl•s theory of method supplies no such thing.

Nor does he use it here.

his use of the philosophical and phenomenological brackets is eminently
successful, but no reason

for, or justification of this usage is offered._

uusserl • s. theory of phenomenological description accurately outlines
his descriptive method.

'!'he relc.tionshiµ which is theoretically supposed

,,.-;::::=-------------------------------------------------------------4-9-to hold

betwe~n

and reductive projects has

the descriptive

supporting evidence.

garner~d

less

Finally his theory of reductions seems almost to be

repudiated by his use of brackets.

However, it :nay yet be redeemed in other

phenomenological investigations.
(2) T-he world of Objects
(;ii ven Husse.L·l • s doctrine of the
problem which he must face.

If we

obJect, the problem of the world is a

We~t

to know the essence of an obJect,

that which will tell us what an object of perception is, 1-1usserl says that
must describe it exactiy as it is given to consciousness.

One of its essential

features, as we have seen, is to be found cunongst_other objects.
of perception is an object simpliciter:
Every object that we can perceive
is to ma ke

us understand

wha~

~o

object

it is never simply given by itself.

is an onject in the world.

If Husserl

he means by an obJeCt perceiYed to be in the

world, he must tell us what he means by world or

11

background 11 •

So if the

probiem of the world goes unanswered, his earlier philosophical endeavours
in Ideas 1 will remain

incomplete.

The problem of the world, however, is not a special problem for the
phenomenologist alone.

\1e

It is a universal philosophical problem, albeit

one which should hold a special interest for a philosopher of science.
Such a man is Alfred North Whitehead, whose exegeais
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of Husserl's problem

establishes it as something more than a problem which must be faced
simply because one chooses to take the phenomenological approach in
philosophy.
Ci) Vihitehead on the problem.
Whitehead begins by pointing out the inevitability of the problem.
live in a world we must try to understand it and communicate our

To
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understanding to others.

Each succeeding generation discovers that former

views of nature were mistaken.
laws of nature.

The passDge of time throws a doubt on all

37

Nevertheless, most people cling to the fundamental
from which these divergent laws arise.
ized as

view of nature

Nature, first of all, is character-

the world as interpreted by reliance on clear and distinct sensory

experiences, visual, auditory and tactile."
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What we clearly and

distinctly see are'::material objects supporting "various qualifications such
as shape, locomotion, colour,

or smell, e t c.

1139

These material objects are

connected purely through spatial relations like being next to, a long
distance from, or actually contacting, and so forth.

40

Natural events are

changes of the qualities of objects, or changes in their spatial relations.

41

nThis is the grand doctrine of Nature as a self-sufficient, meaningless
complex of facts.

'742
It is the doctrine of the autonomy of physical science."

This view of nature is consonant with common sense, and can be
verified at any moment of our existence.

Yet modern thought has been forced

to abandon every one of these notions while retaining the idea that
scientific Views of nature are autonomous.
is a complete muddle in scientific thought.

The result, Whitehead says,
43

The first tenet of our common sense view of nature to be nbandoned by
modern science is the belief that natural objects have sensible qualities
like colour, sound, and scent.
sensible

S±nce Galileo (1514-1602) distinguished the

from the mathematictJ. properties of an object, and designated the

latter as the proper subject for scientific investigFtion, physics has
concerned itself only with the quantitative aspects of nature.
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Sensible
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qualities of natural objects are no longer
as

~hitehead

reg~rded

as a part of the world,

says, they are thought to be the mental reactions of the

percipient to internal bodily motions.
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The conclusion thct Whitehead draws

from this change in Viewpoint is thet "sense perception, for all :tts
practicG-1 importance, is very. supn•ficial in its disclosure of the nature of

.
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things.n
The notion that physical objects exhibit only spatial relationships is
anotlrer common sense belief that has been abandoned by the sciences.
Sir Robert Boyle's (1627-1691) theories of motion and magnetism accounted
for these phenomena by postulating a medium for their transmission.
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Transmission theories of light· and sound also demand a medium for their waves
and particles.

So, in spite of its empty appearance, space was supposed to

be occupied by subtle kinds of matter called ether.

The modern physicis.t

regards tae world as a plenum, a field of force and actiVity whose energy and
actions can be e:xpressed in mathematical

formul~e.
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A corollary of the new View is the elimination of physical objects.
If there is no empty space, then there t;c.re no c;istinct material things
supporting the mathematical properties which the physicist tries to discover •
.c·he whole world is full of material which is usually rarified, but cen be
exceptionally dense in sone places.

The so-called material objects we

perceive, on this theory, are merely "knots in the ether"
exceptional places where matter is more dense th;::.n usual.
now

49

, or
.i:he physicist is

able to explain the interconnectedness of more naturD.L events.

l:lut

he has done so a.t tne expense of contradicting our rno:Jt 1'undainental con:mon
senGe ideas about nature.
our senses.

Physical sciences contradicts the evidence of

l'his contradiction levds i.hitehee.cLto point out wh&t he .thinks _
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is ••the extreme superficie.11 ty of the broad generalizc.tions Which mankind
acquires on the basis of sense perception."

50

The muddle in sciencif1c thoucht of which ;.'ihitehead speaks occurs for
two reasons:

the scientist has retained the doctrine of the autonomy of the

sciences;

he can no longer verify scientific theories at any given moment

~nd

of his existence.

The doctrines of modern science have

consonant with common sense.

ceased to be

The man in the streets "sees"

thet nature is

the sum-total of material objects which he.ve perceivable qualities and
exhibit

spatial relations amongst themselves.

riodern .theories of physics, on

the other hand, compel us to say that the v:orld is

pn

imperceptiole process,

a complex of activity which exhibits constant patterns that are
~athematical.ly

describable.
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the correc't one, it seems that we need look no farther than what we have
inmediatel~

before us.

~he

common sense

idea of the·world appears to be

true because we seem to see a world which corresponds exac'tly to the
thet we have ot it.

here we are

~dea

appealing to something like a correspondence

criterion for d.e'termining truth.

~•e

know ths.t ideas are true when they

describe exactly what we see.
Physical theories of the world, of course, cen make no such appeal.
As \lhitehead correctly points out, since physics. and con:mon sense have
parted company, scientific theo;.:ies cannot claim to be verifiable at any
given moment of our experience.
autono:ny for other reasons.

rfhe scientist has had gre<0.t success in predicting

and even controllint:: the course
to u.s oecause they work.

~•e

Iet the scientific world view retains its

01

nature.

Current scientific ideas appeal

say that they are trute because they are useful.
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The same pragma.tic criterion will lead us to

say that they are false when

we find other ones thc.t work better.

\Vhy

This is

stacceeding generations of

scientists ssy thot the world Views of their predecessors were
have two competing notions of the

i•e

natural one, Dnd a
and'~ farther

appeals

v~rying

scientific one.

"'.orld then:

mis~aken.

an uncllanging

They seem to be drifting farther

apart ·11ith the development· of modern science.

Each of -i;hem

to a different standard to verify its truthfulness.

satisfy the demands of their respective criteria.

and botn

There seems to be no

theory or cor mon stendard that can be used to mediate or to choose between.1
them.

So long as we remain within the domain of t·heory, we can only wonder

how such a

choice can

be made, and wonder further if it is not a cnoice

that can be avoiC..ed.
(ii) Husserl's solution
Husserl, I maintain, is addressing a

genuine philosophical problem of

no small importance in the third and fifth chapters of Ideas 1, where he sets
out to discover the "shifting but ever-present
. receives
.
.
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world- ti.1es1s
1. t s essen tial meaning.

horizon through which the
Important though the problem

is in itself, we must not lose sight of our methodological concern.
Husserl always has it in mind:
We should remark in conclusion th~t the genere.lity
with which we have stated these last reflections
concerning the constituting of the natural world
in absolute consciousness should give no offence •••
our aim.has not been to proVide a detailed theory of
such transcendental constitutinG ••• \fhat is essential
for our purpose is to see upon evidence th9t the
phenomenolo6ical reduction ••• is possible ••• and that
when carried out, the absolute or ?Ure trag~cendental
consciousness is left over as residuum •••
Here Husserl explicitly states that his main concern in treating this

/
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problem is a methodological. one.

He offer$ .only the bare outline of a

solution because he wents more than anything else to demonstrate what it
means to bracket something.
his method

correspo~ds

Careful observation should also tell us whether

with his methodology.

f{usserl finds that science and common sense offer us only derivative
ideas about nature.
and Its

In ch.apter three (The Thesis of the !fotural Standpoint
54

Suspension~

he proposes to make clear to us what we mean by saying

that we look at the world "from the natural standpoint" or in a common
sense way.

55

It should then also be clear what he

natur&J.. viewpoint.

mean~

by suspending the

In the same chapter he scrutinizes the scientific

viewpoint, by examining the world of mathematics.
In Chapter five (The Region-of Pure Consciousness), he tries to point
out the logical possibility, "but
world outside our own.

r~al

absurdity" of a (mathematical)

FinaJ.ly he tries to determine whe.t ltind of meaning

we can gi\'e on phenomenological grounAS to the statement that there is a
world.
Genuine phenomenological. description, according to Husserl's theory,
becomes possible only after a reduc:::.ion has directed our attention to what
should be observed.

56

However, in this case,· before the application of

brackets, Husserl tries to show how the world presents itself to us when
we look at it from the natural. standpoint; he outlines the
Which perceived and

backgrounds on

intuited objects appear; and he tries to describe the

essentic:l connections which hold amongst the world, the intuitive backcround,
and the field of perception.

How can we reconcile this practice wi ta his

theory of method?
Husserl says thC1t from the naturcl stcnd;Joint we are aware of a world

55

without spatial or temporal limit.

At first glance this seems to be a bald

that we live in an infinite v1orld.

st~tement

that this is not what he meant.
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But his subsequent analyses reveal

Experience tells us that this world is

inhabited by individuals -- corporeal things, animals and
object of k11owledge presents itself
perception.

0
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Every

figure on a background of

What is actually perceived ••• is partly pervaded, partly

girded about with a
reality"

as a

people.

dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate

This indeterminate background or perceptual field is very

lir:tited.
But we can transcend its limits.

.
,,
·Husserl observes that he can ••• let

his attention wander through unseen portions of his room behind his back, to
159

1

the veranda, the garden, and children outdoors.

As he successively directs

his attention to each ·ei:t these things, it presents itself .as an object on
the intui.tive background of the others.

'l'his gradually constituted field

of .intuition can form · 11 a continuous ring around the actuel fiei_d of
perception."
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The field of intuitive

presence, although larger than that

of perception, is limited by one•s intuitive and retentive powers.
It still remains to be eXplained what Husserl means by say!ng thet we are
aware of a

world without

spa~ial

limit.

'i'he clue to this explanation can be

found in Husserl's notion of the intuitive field,

According to him, the

field of intuitive presence is COillposed not only of formerly intuited objects,
but also all those things to which we have not yet directed our attention.
Husserl says that objects, animals and men
are present in my field of intuition even when I
pay them no attention ••• For me real objects are
there, definite, more or less familiar, agreeing
with whet is actuc:il.1.Y perceived without being
61
themselves perceived or even intuitively present.

\
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At this point nusserl is plainly suceesting that our Collll!lon sense notion of
the world is not a

constitu~ive

concept.

.he sum-tota.L of materia1 objects

etc., is a ''misty horizon that can never be completely outlined". 62
It is the horizon from which things appear when we become aware of
r.hat can Husserl mean by saying that we
without any spatial limits?
limitationsr

~very

'

~aem.

.are natural.LY aware of a world.

What more than that we are aware of our cognitive

single thing that we know has been selected from tne

sum-total of all things.

Ultimately it stands out from this background, but

it appears to us on a background whicfi is limited by our cognitive povrnrs.
And ye-r, no one m:;..stc.kes the .limits of this background for the end of the wor.1.d.
~e

use our common sense notion of the world to regulate the

constitutive process we call knowledge.

By directing our atcention to

several different obJectG, we can constitute a picture of them all.

We

"seet1 that the world

is something more than what we know after any given

amount of cognition.

This "something more" points always toward the ideal of

knowing all things, an ideal which is impossible to realize
but

com_!Jletely,

necessary for the advancement of knowledge.
It belongs to the essence of the natura.L si;andpoint to think that the

world, or sum-totol of obJects is "out there", waiting to be discovered.
All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural
world leaves standing thege.nera.l thesis of the
natural stand9oint. "The" world is ••• always there;
at the most it is at odd points "other·• than r
supposed ••• but the "it" remains ever in the senses
of the general thesis, a world that has its being
out there. 63

"•e may be mistaken now and thon about one thing or another, but' our
thc:;t the world is "out there'; remains unshaken.
source of our common sense notion

of the world.

f<;i~h

This natural attitude is the

5?

we are now in a position to understand whst Husserl means by a
suspension of the natural. attitude.

He means precisely to "suspend" our

be..Lie:f that the sum-total of all objects is out there.

·this ·•suspension"

of belief, however, does not require us to believe that the world does
exist.

not

As Husserl says of the suspension:
It is not a transformation of the thesis into its
antithesis; it is also not a transformation into •••
indecieion"._.qoubt~ ••.' R.atheir
j_·:t: ·is something quite
unique. We. do not abandon the thesis we have adopted,
we make no changes in our conviction. 6 4

Odd though it may sound, Husserl is suggesting that we can "suspend" our
common sense notion of the world without changing our conviction that it exists.
How can such a thing be possible?

Although the procedure seems to be

self-contradictory, a closer examination reveals that it is not.

Husserl

merely means to suggest that we ce.n retain our b'elief ·as long as -we leave it unexpressed during phenomenological investigation:
this entire natural world therefore which is
continually "there for us", "present· to our hand"
an9 will ever remain there, :Ls a "fact-world" of
which we will continue to be conscious, even though
it pleases us to put it into rackets •
••• I do not then deny the world as though· I
were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as
though I were a septic; but I use the "phenomenological"
epocke' which bars me from using any judgment
that concerns spatio-temporal existence.6;;
The phenomenological suspension is unlike the eristical argumen.t _a_.S.ophist _
might use to make it appear that there is and is not a world out there.

Nor

is it like the denial of the sceptic who disbelieves that there is a world.
As long as. the natural attitude is supposed to be suspended, the phenomenolo5ist
simply refrains from expressing any opinion at all about the sum-total of
individual things, or e.ny individual thereof.

However, it remains for
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Husserl to show that there is anything left to talk about.

What else has

existence besides individuals?
Husserl postpones this question until he has scrutinized the scientific
worldvi.ew.
a b out hi m.

This he does in two stages.
66

First he refers to the "ideal worlds"

Then he undertakes to show the logical possibility but real

absurdity of a mathematical "world" outside our o\vn.
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Husserl's investigation of the ideal worlds about him is an attempt to
articulate in

ph~nomenological

terms the world view of modern science; he

tries to show how the world of arithmetic presents itself; he shows th&t it
is much like our world of common sense.

But in the end he is forced to

admit that the world views of common sense and science cannot be reconciled
on phenomenological grounds.
Modern science would have us believe that the world is an imperceptible
process exhibiting mathematical patterns.

·rhe ideal world of mathema·cics

manifests itself when we are occupied with numbers.
~ike

the world of perception.

~ach

in a wa:y it is much

number stands out from the background of

those we have been paying attention to.

·J.·lle focus of our vision is

surrounded by the sum-total of all number combinations, a mathematical.
aorizon which is partly defined, and partly not, out obviously there.
There is, however, one important difference.
Present in the background of consciousness.

'l'he natural world is always

On the other hand, the world of

c::rithmetic is present only so long as we ousy ourselves witi1 numbers.
Me

cease

mathem~tical

68

When

operc.tions, the \'lorlei of numbers is suspended, while

the naturru. •1orld rem.:,ins.
·rhere seems not to

69

be any connection between them.

The natural world

t:lnd the world of mather.w.tics may preoent themselves to us to0ether, but they

~

59

are not one and the same.

70

A phenomenolot,ical investigation has failed to reconcile the two
competitive world Views.

71

·.rhe only alternative is tc

disregard them and

search for a more basic one which undercuts their dichotomy,
would seem to call for a straightforward procedure;

Circumstances

Husserl has suspended the

natural viewpoint; and the mathematical one has suspended itself. But in
spite of the transitory nature of its mathematical i•world", modern science
would have us believe that nature is an imperceptiole process exhibiting
mathematical patterns.

So Husserl is compelled to show the "real absurdity"

of the idea of a world existing outside the one we perceive.

Only

afterwards can he produce a recognizably better idea.
Husserl says there is no formal contre_diction in supposing that there
exists !!'- "Real Something" outside the world we perceive.
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But if we should

ask what kind of evidence is needed_ to esta,blish the truth of
there cc:n be only one answer:
we can experience.

73

~he

sopposition,

it must be established on the basis of what

J.f the hypothesis of a world outside our own is

contradicted by this eVidence, then it is nonsensical and cannot be made.
~xperience

tells us that there is no mathematical world out there.

Husserl has already shown us that it can offer no evidence of an abiding world
of pure numbers.

nor can it be argued that the perceived and the

mathematic<l "worlds" are integrated.

We do perceive things quantitatively.

But the vague quantities-like smaller or larger, higher or lower, nearer
or fe>rther - which pervade our !'ields of experience do not correspond to the
refined notions the modern scientist uses.

.::iince the scientific notion of a

mathematical world is contradicted by our experience, it is "really nonsense",

it is a supposition which cannot be made despite its usefulness.74
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The supposition that objects exist "outside" the world of percep't:ion
iS fundamentally mistaken.

The realism of LJescartes and of modern science is

the product of the same fallacy that produced Berkeley 1 s idealism.
believed

th~t

Berkeley

an object of perception grows or diminishes as its observer

approaches or retreats from it because he confused his perception With the
object perceived:· They varied while the object did not.

Berkeley committed

the fallacy of confusing a perspected variable with its perspectival
variations.

Similarly, Husserl says, realism confuses the objects of per-

ception with the absolute

exper~ences

which constitute them

·10

when the objects

of perception are thought to be perceptions themselves, it becomes necessary
to posit a world of objects "beyond" the world of perception.
With the elimination of the scientific world view, it becomes possible
for Husserl to propose a more basic one.

This he does in two steps.

After

noticing that there is a horizon through which the world-thesis receives its
essential meaning, he examines this

horizon.

76

Then he proposes to tell us

what kind of meaning can be ascribed to the term "world" on its grounds.
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Besides the sum-total of all perceivable objects and all possible
number combinations,

we know thDt there exists also our consciousness of them.

Husserl suggests that consciousness would persist even if the world did not.
What does it mean .to say that we are aware of the world from a
phenomenological standpoint?
certain coherent patterns.

It means we know that our experience exhibits
By restricting our attention to the fields of

consciousness and the objects constituted therein, we find that we can speak
of a world because those things are "put together" harmoniously.

Husserl

says that when we bracket our common sense notion of the world, we admit:
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it is conceivable that our experiencing function
swarms with oppositions that cannot be evened
out...
that the things it puts together should
persist harmoniously ••• , and that its conuectedness ••• ,
--th~t a world, in short, exists no longer. 78
our experience exhibits coherence, harmony, and connectedness.
we come to be aware of the world•

Through them

Without them, it could not be said to exist.

This horizon through which we become aware of the world directs Husserl
towards something that is more fundamtnatl than the totality of existent
things.

The perception of a totality of things is possible only if they can

be seen to co-exist harmoniously.

The epistemological priority of such a

harmony prompts Husserl to say that:
Reality and world, here used are just the titles for
certain valid unities of meaning, namely, unities of
meaning related to certain organizations of pure
absolute consciousness which dispense meaning and
show forth its validity in certain essentially fixed,
specific ways •
••• the whole being of the world consists in a certain
"meaning" which presupposes absolute consciousness
as the field from which its meaning .is derived.79
Husserl uses the term "meaning" to refer to the harmonious experience which
occurs when we
its background.

~urn

80

our attention from an object to single another out from
~he

notion of the world as the harmoniously constituted

appearance of things, therefore, is more iundamental than any regulative
notion of a
things.

totality, whether it be a totality of numbers, or of perceivable

Both views presuppose that members of each totality can be harmon-

1ously constituted.

An object perceived to be in the world is one which can

be selected from the background of another object, and perceived to exist
harmoniously with it.
liv) Husserl's Method.
Husserl's description of things lJ.ermonious1:Y I?Utt:i.IJ.g themselves toe;ether
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addresses 1.hitehead•s problem fairly successfully.

lie has established

(against common.sense) that there cannot be a totality of perceivable things
that does not put itself together harmoniously, and (against modern physics)
that the idea of a purely mathematical world is really absurd.
Again, ilusserl 1 s method of treating the problem corresponds roughly to
his methodology.

~is

theory of description is verified once more.

But in

spite of our hopes to the contrary, his use of brackets does not completely
illustrete his theory of reductions.
betueen descriptive

nor does it clarify the relationship

and reductive projects.

Husserl describes the world as the "meaning"; or
of objects.

harmonious persistence

He took five steps to reach this conclusion.

that the world is composed of indiViduals.

First, he observed

He clarified his awareness of

the world by observing objects in front of him, and by thinking of others
behind his back.

He analysed his awareness of the world by distinguishing

his perception of those in front of him from his intuition of those behind
him.

After perceiving and intUiting

a variety

of the

in~vidual.s.

compo2e the world, he found that his awareness of all of them
structure of a figure on a background.

that

retain~d

the

Because of its persistence, it is

thought to be essential to our awareness of it.

Finally, he noticed that

things known to exist together, composing the world, are essentially connected.
'.i.'hey put themselves together harm?niously in his field of attention as he
turned from one object to another.
the world is.

Finally he is able to say what he thinks

Although his description could have been more straightforward,

it follows the general lines indicated by his theory.
The suspension of the natural

viewpoint contributes little to Husserl's

~,
theory of reduction. Al though his methodology ~i~~~ngµ~~l!_e_s _plJ.il,g~so:;:i)lj._~
l~~~~~~

~

,
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eidetic, and pllenomenolo£ical reductions, and suegests that they should be

applied consecutively, ttusserl•s suspension of the natural. viewpoint displays
characteristics of aJ.l three of them.

It eliminates the common sense theory

that the wor:Ld is the sum total. of individuaJ.s, as a philosophical reduction
should.

Like an eidetic reduction, it tells us that the existence of

individuals can be ignored.

And like a phenomenological. reduction, it bars

us from using judgments about a spatio-temporaJ.ity.
can restore a

scmblanc~

Only one interpretation

of theoretical. order to Husserl's procedure.

we

cannot suppose that the suspensions were meant to be used one after the other.
they must be interpreted as three different aspects of the same technique.
1his interpretation, of course, is very generous to Husserl.
~ut

speculation such as this is very damaging to the relationship which

is supposed to

hold

theory of method.

between~,descripti ve

and reductive projects in Husserl• s

Brackets are supposed to direct the phenomenologist to

something which can be observed and described.

The principle of all

principles leads us to believe that each step in the phenomenological.
description should be preceded by a reduction of some sort.

Actually, this

time it holds true only of Husserl's observation of essential connections
between objects harmoniously constituting the world.

It seems to be

preceded, not by one, but by three of them.
Husserl's theory of reductions, as well as the theoretical relationship
between phenomenoloe;ical projects, must be verified elsewhere.
Husserl's method has

On the whole,

proven to be much less well orgc-nized than his theory

of method and scientific ideal would lead us to believe.
(3) Other People in the World.
We perceive thRt the world is composed of

individuals~-objects,

animals,

64

Husserl identified the world with their harmonious composition.

we

an turn our attention from one individual to another in an unbroken stream

C

o! consciousness.

r-.·--

The unbroken stream is possible because the two ."put

th6mselves together" harmoniously.

Husserl cal.ls their harmony a meaning.

Individuals have meaning for a perceiver.
8

If the world of the perceiver were

world of inanimate objects only, Husserl's thumbnail sketch would be

complete.
But the world is also a world of animate things--of animals and people.
It is part of the "meaning" of my w9rld that other people should "put
themselves together" in it, and thet it should "put itself together" for them.
until Husserl can explain how we know that other people in the world exist,
his world-view is incomplete.

...;_

As a final test of Husserl's phenomenological method, I propose to
exBJZO,ne the fifth of his Cprtesian .. Neditations where he tries to add to his
world-view by explaining how we know that other people in the world exist.
The problem is especially interesting for two reason.

The first· of these

is that the problem and Husserl's method of dealing with philosophical
problems seem to be incommensurable.

While the other person exists

ambivalently, being at the same time a perceiVing subject and an object of
perception, Husserl's first principle of method demands that only the giving
of objects to consciousness

should be described.

person as a perceiving subject?
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Can we know another

If so, can the phenomenon of knowing

another person .as percei:ll'ing subject be described?

These and other related

questions attest to the fundamental importance of the problem in Husserl• s
Philosophy. 82
Husserl's treatment of the problem__i~~_so_~~~!_!~~~~~~~y interesting

r.-----------------------------------------------------------------6-5.....
because it is so di_fficul t to interpret.

On the one

hand~

it has been claimed

tbat Husserl's treatment of the problem is very much like John Stuart Mill's
(1800-1873).
85

83

subject:

According to Mill, no one directly perceives another person

the existence of another subject is deduced from the behaVior of

a body which resembles the perceiver's own.
work on the problem

On the other hend, Husserl's
8
in Ideas 2 has been compared to Edith Stein•s (1891-1942).

Since she claimed that we perceive other people as subjects by empathizing
with them and
other people,

since Husserl believed that empathy gives us knowledge of
85

it is difficult to reconcile Ideas 2 where he

his belief with the fifth cartesian meditation.

justifi~s

Why should we infer the

existence of something we can directly perceive¥

Does Husserl really resort

to inference in- the fifth cartesian

To answer these questions,

meditation¥

I propose to examine Mill's, Stein's and then .nusserlis treatment,of the
problem.

(i) John Stuart Mill on the problem.
John Stuart Mill examined Sir William Hamilton's philosophy with the
purpose of trying to ascertain what eVidence it has to offer for the
exitence of other people.

According to Hamilton, the self is nothing

but a series of feelings, and the mind is either the actual succession of
.
f ee1 ing
or it s mere possi"b"l"t
1 1 y. So

rdll finds that for !1amilton, self and

mind are practically the same thing.
\'/hat eVidence can Eamilton offer for the existence of other people while
he holds this doctrine of the self•t

Mill finds that nami1ton 1 s doctrine

of the self allows only one kind of evide:1ce for the existence of other
people.

His manner of posing the problem is particularly important because

it points towards

a particular kind of solution, one which has been edopted

rr
'
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b;;; manY

Mill asks:

modern ph1.losophers.

By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations
am t led to believe that there exist other sentient
. creatures; that the walking and speeking figures which
l see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or, in
other words, possess ~1nds? The most strenuous Intuitionist does not include this among the things that I
I conclude it from certain
know by direct intuition.
things, which my experiences of my own states of feeling
proves to me to be marks of it.87
The problem of

knowing other people, for Hamilton, for t:ill, and for

their moderu successors is the problem of knowing other minds.
Furthermore,
of

oth~r

r-;111 construes mind in a way that makes direct knowledge

minds impossible:

a mind is only a series of states of feeling.

While one mind ma.y think or feel similarly about the same :thing as another,
neither can have the thought or feeling that the other has.

What would it

be like for you to think my thoughts or for me to feel your· feelings·,
an idea does violence to the notion of two separi;tte

minds~

such-

Nill claims that

we are not directly aware Of other minds and,therefore, are not directly
aware of other people •.

\';e

·can see only "marks" or signs of their existence.

Mill's experience of his own states of feeling provide him with two
signs of the existence of others.

He perceives that his own subjective

feelings always occur in the middle of a series of events which begins with
the modification of his body and ends with bodily behevior.
example, thet someone·is sitting awkwardly

in a chair.

of his body causes him to feel uncomfortable.
assuties a

different position.

oec~

~his

Suppose, for
modification

use of his discomfort, he

1"1111 would say th2.t feelings of discomfort

are priv.ste, but the awkard position of one's body and the assu:uption of
another position are publicly observable•
':.::-·

r:ill believes thnt other people

have feelings because they have bodies like his and they act <:>.s he uoes.
--·-·---

- - - - - ·----- · - - - - - - - - - - - · - - -- - - - - - -

r
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Th• bodies of others and their bod:ily activity, the

antecedents and

consequences of private feelings, are publicly observable.
Mill claims he can prove inductively the existence of other people
on the basis of these two observations.

cs.n see a series of causes:

88

In his own case, Mill thinks he

modifications of body cause subjectiv.e feelings

which cause bodily activity.

In the case of other people, i1e only claims

to see the first and last in the series.

Inductive inferences establishes

that the series he cannot see are exactly like the ones he cen.
people look and act like him.

Other

For an exact likeness it is necessary that

they should also have feelings like his.

Therefore., Mill thinks that the

bodies of others and their bodily behavior indicate the presence of
subjective feelings in others.

This proof 1

he claims, is at least certain

as laws of physics which rest on the foundation-of inductive inference.
According to Mill, the possession of subjective feelings is the same thing
as having a mind which is the same thing as having a self.

Therefore, Mill

thinks he has evidence sufficient to prove that other people exist even though
he does not think that he can see them.

(ii) Edith Stein on the problem.
Mill thought that the most strenuous intuitionist would never claim
to have immediate knowledge of other people's feelings.
What Edi th Stein claims we have.
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This is precisely

She says tha.t the world-in which we live

is not only a world of physical bodies, but also of experiencing subjects
external to us, whose experiences we know.

90

Although we are sometimes

mistruten or deceived, we can usually grasp the feelings of other people.
She designates the acts in which- foreign.experience is grasped as acts of

t-em_p_a_t_b_.y_,_a_._n_d_s_h_e_m_a_k_e_s_i_t_h_e_r_t_a_sk
__t_o_o_b_s_e_r_v_e_a_n_d_d_e_s......
c r...i_b_e_a""c'"'"t_s_o...f_e...m
...p•a•t•h""'y---..1
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in

their e;reatest essential generality. 91
The essence of empathy is compared with those of other acts of

consciousness.

Miss Stein frames the example of a friend who tells her

he bas lost his brother.

She becomes aware of his pain.

The important thin5

16 not.to know how she arrived at this awareness, but what it itself is.

92

It cannot be an outer perception because pain is not a spatial object.
Nevertheless, empathy resembles outer perception in that it presents
object here and now, though one of a different kind.

93

In this respect

it is also 1ike seeing a geometrical axiom, holding a value,
upon something.

an
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or reflectins

Each of these acts present its own kind of object.

Empathy

iS the awareness of an object of a particular kind, namely the experiences of
other people.
Edith Stein's description of empathy seems not to prove that we are
directly acquainted with o.ther people as subjects.

Other people exist

ambivalently, being at the same time perceiving subjects and objects of
perception.

The pain of Edith Stein's friend seems to have been given

her as an object of consciousness.

It remains unclear how she can know

him empathically as a perceiving subject.
Further observations reveals th2t the experience of empathy has three
grades or modes of accomplishment.

~dith

Stein confesses that when the

experience of another, for example the sadness of her friend, first arises
before her, it faces her as an intentional object.
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.ihen she tries to clarify

the feeling of sadness, she imagines herself in her friend's situation turned
towards the thing that made him sad.

The fulfilled meaning of sadness then

becomes clear to her and she has knowledge of her friend as a subject.
~-

~
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.n.fter an imaginctive moment, the fulf:tllmenJ_Qf:_feel~in.c...,q:n:--:cc-"l:~--~-111£'dec ).n

ri__.--.------~
object of knowledce.
Edith Stein thinks that we can know another person, not only as an
. t 97
object, b ut v 1 so as a su b Jee
•

In either case she finds it difficUlt

to see how anyone could advocate the view that we see nothing around us
but physical soulless and lifeless bodies.

98

(iii) Husserl's solution of the problem.
Husserl approaches the problem of other people
objection

o~ainst

99

as though it were an

the phenomenological method of philosophizing, or to be

more specific, against the phenomenological epokhe.

100

The epokhe reduces

a living person like Edmnrid Husserl to the status of an impersonal ego.

If

the phenomenological reduction must precede all genuinely phenomenological
philosophy, then its proper field of study
conscious life.
consciousness.

101

is the transcendental ego and its

Other people are not merely part of an impersona]_ ego's

A part of one's consciousness does not account for another;s

otherness or for his personality;,-.

It seems tnat phenomenological method

cannot do justice to the existence of other people.
Husserl responds to this objection by showing that the phenomenological
reduction is necessary for a fundamental understanding of human relationships:
he reduces his existence to that of a transcendental ego; he observes it, its
essential rela'tionship to an alter ego, and their essential connection with
the world in which all people live (Lebenswelt;.

His description uncovers

the most essential structure of any person's awareness of another.

Its

procedure sug&ests that instead of preventing an understanding of interpersonal relationships, the ppokhe is required to make it possible.
.

to have refuted the claim that phenomenology muet be solipsistic •

1ie claims

103

.:.iefore the reduction husserl is strcigiitforwardly aware of other people

ri---------------------------------------------------------------------7-0--.
as

objects in the world and at the same time as subjects who experience

the same world what he does.
in the same way,

He

exist~

104

He also knows that they e.re aware of him

and other people exist in the same objective

world, yet each person has his own private experiences.

Husserl wants to

understand his existence in a world of other people.
After applying the epokhe, Husserl can no longer differentiate himself
from and contrast himself with others.

For descriptive purpose, he is no

ionger the usual l, this man ~dmund Husserl. lOS
epistemological subject.

He is an essentially

The same holds true of otl1er people.

The reduction

abstracts an essential structure from the concrete.relationships which he
as a person has·with other people.
individuals and

lt eliminates methodological concern for

makes it possible for him to

concentrate on essential.

structures in which the knowing subject lives his life.
·.i:o

characterize the ego's own essential sphere, !-Iusserl performs

another epokhe which is even more abstract then the .i;henomenological one;
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The other knowing subjects to which husserl•s ego is essentially related are
removed from further consideration.

Their living being, their cultural

predicates, and their characteristic of belonging to the world of the ego
are removed.

The world of the transcendental ego is no longer a world

perceived by them.

At this point tlusserl parts company with Edith stein.

His procedure suggests that in his eyes, empathic

experience is not the

ultimate foundation of our experience of other people. 107

Husserl seems

to be searching for the foundation which makes acts of empathy possible.
After the extra reduction, Husserl still finds it possible to experience
something.

There remains a "substratum" of the world more basic than that

Which puts itself torether for all knowing subjects, namely that v;1d.ch puts

r-----------------------------------------71

itself together for all knowing subjects, namely that which puts itself

.
108
toget h er f or on 1 y one o f t nem.

The psychic life of the ego Ylith all its

actual and possible experiences is completely unaffected by the brack.e ts.

109

It remains for Husserl to show that our experience of other people and an

objective world rest 9n this foundation.
His transcendental ego perceives not only other objects but also its own
identity.

110

It belongs to the concrete essence of the ego to be made

an object in his own world.

perception as an object.

The transcendental ego is given to himself in

His body stands out from all other objects because

only in it do consciousness and its object coincide.
. t whi ch is
is a su b Jee

kinesthet~cally

The animated body

.
th.ing. t 11
aware of itsel f as a moving

But perception is given with temporal horizons.

It gives awareness only of

events which occur in the living present.
For this reason, the essence of the ego is experienced mostly in acts of
.
consciousness
whi c h are no t percep t•ions. 112
livingly present.
and anticipation

The ego, past and future, is not

Yet the ego retains its identity through time.

Recollection

appresent the ego's past and future so that it may be

identified with his living presence.

The ego which existed in the past

is the one which exists now and will continue to exist in the future.
identity of the ego depends upon

acts of consciousness which render

something else present besides the object of perception.
that these acts are

.

.

The

.appresentative.

Husserl says

113

The transcendental ego is essentially a body-subject.

It has the

essential structure of a figure on a backgro1u1d, st:mding out as an
animated body which is kinesthetically aware of itself as a moving object.
l';ith the oc:?.ssage of time, it retflins its identity_.t.h~ueh-..ac.tf;,Af ap~;,es.ell.t~--~:
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ation.
Husserl begins to outline the essence of interpersonal relationships
bY asking us to imagine that another person enters the perceptual sphere of
the ego.

114

The reduced or essential significance of this event is thDt

a body appears.

The perceived body has two essential

cho~acteristics:

a part of the ego's world of experience; and it resembles e.nother
that world--the ego's own body.

it is

objec~

in

The latter of these two properties in the

foundation of interpersonal relationships.
Husserl says thDt only a similarity connecting that body over there
with the ego's body can serve as the basis for identifying that body as
another person.

115

Their similarity makes them a pair, two members of a kind.
.

They belong to a plurality of distinct but similar objects.
membership

The

of individuals in groups like this one is a universal phenomenon

of the transcendental sphere.
individua.l

116

Membership .in the same group allows one

to be understood in terms of another.

As Husserl says, in

members of a group we find "an. overlaying of each with the sense of the
o th er. "117

When a body v.rith determinations similar to his is paired with it

as a member of the same group, it appropriates in virtue of its membership
the sense of a living, moving organism.
of the other are essentially related

118

The body of the ego and the body

on the basis of their similCU'

determinations.
Because of the similar determinations of the two bodies, there is
an essential relstionship "overlaying" them.

The body of the other is

intended as a member of the cle.ss of living, moving ti1ings.

Its membership
11

is verified by

11

j_ts ch:n[;ing but incessantly harmonious behavior.

119

The essential connection between the two bodies does not yet provide

r_.------------------------------------------------,
73

us with the foundation of our knowledge of other people.

'l'he other person

exists ambivalently, being at .the seme time a perceiving subject and the
object of a perception, while Husserl's transcendental ego se'ems to know the
other only as an object.
0 ur

·ro prove that this knowledge is the foundation of

knowledge of other.people, he must explaiA how, on its basis, the

other is appresented as a subject who is a perceiver.
t'he key to the problem of knowing another subjectively is Husserl's
idea of the body-subject.
of itself.

.i'io

~very li~ing 1

0ver There."

bod~

is kinesthetically aware

matter where ·it moves, the body-subject always perceives itself

"Here" in the centre of its reduced
11

mov.1.ng

wo~ld • . The

other is always perceived

Nevertheless, the transcendental ego can vary its position

to that of the other.

~urthermore,

he can freely imagine what the objects

in his world look like from the other side without actually going there.
It is possible to know the far side of
there because the front of

thi~gs

any object of

and prescribes a determination to it.

120

without actually moving over

perc~ption

appresents a rear aspect

Husserl claims to know the other ego,

not merely as a. perceived object like himself, but as an apperceived subject
having the srune structure of experience he should have if he were to go
ov3r there and be where he is.
himself from
ac t •

~ill.

121

At this point Husserl has dissociated

Apperception is not an inference or even a reflective

122

The transcendental ego and any other are essentially related as
subjects who perceive the same things in the same way

from any given position.

On the basis of this relationship we are supposed to know one another as
people living in the same world.

out Husserl can say the.t his tranncendental

er;o and any other exist in the same world only if he can show how the srune
--~------
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.

~
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object can be perceived by both of them.
Again, the key to the problem is Husserl's notion of the body-subject.
ttusserl states the problem of knowing the same object in terms of the body
of the other.

He asks how we can say that the body which appe.:rs •iQver 'J:here 11

to him is the same one thich appears "Here" for the other subject.

123

·1·he

problem, he suggests, is essentially the same as the problem of the identity
of·, the transcendental ego which moves here and there as time passes.

provGn to be the same by acts of appresentation.

It is

Similarly, the body of the

other, perceived to be uover There" by the ego, is appresented to the ego as
the body "Here" for the other.

When both sides of·an object are presented

in the same stream of consciousness, they can be identified as belonging to
the same object.
experience of it

'.J.:he same holds true of any other object.
C<·n

be appresented to the transcendental. ego is the same way.

In this manner, a social reality and all

~ts

to different subjects existing in the same world.
products of these

Another• s

appres~ntations

related to each other.

~he

The ultimate cultural

are the personalities of the two subjects

world of other people

world and the world of culture.

cultural objects are given

integrates the physical

Husserl calls it the world of life

(Lebenswel t).
The fifth of Husserl 1 s Cartesian J':edi t.:,tions

proves thet the

reductions are indispensible for an understanding of the foundation of
interpersonal relationships.
Would be a

mist~e

To put the matter a little differently, it

to think of Husserl's later Lebenswelt philosophy

as a repudiation of his earlier work.
the1:1 as discontinuous projects.

It would £11.so be wrong to look at

'.i'ranscendcntal egology and the philosophy

of Lebenswelt ulli1:1ately are inter;r;;l parts of a single ·:;>lan.

Husserl's

'------------------------------------------------------~
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own words speak eloquently of his singleness of purpose:
For the present it must suffice that we have
indicated these problems of a higher level as
problems of constitution and thereby made it
understandable that, with the systemc.tic
progress of transcendental-phenomenolocical
explication of the apodictic ego, the
transcendental sense of the world must also
become disciosed to us ultimately in the full
concreteness with which it is incessantly
the life-world of all of us.124
(iv) Husserl's Method
Husserl's approach to the problem of the foundation

@f

knowledge of othe1

people has led him beyond the "solutions 11 offered by John Stuart Hill and
Edith Stein.

For Mill, the problem of knowing the existence of other people

is the problem of knowing other minds.

He thinks that we know the existence of

other minds, not intuitively, but by inferring it from the similar behavior
of the bodies of others and our own.

Husserl, on the other hand, does not

reduce the problem of knovring other peopJ.e to the problem of knowing other
minds.

He recognizes that knowlepge of the other person's body end bodily

behavior are an essential part of our knowledge of others.
Husserl, we he.ve intuitive
The body of

According to

knowledge of the existence of other minds.

the other appresents itself as a subject having the same

experiences we would have if we stood over there where he is.
Edi th Stein, like Husserl,
other people.

claims that we have intuitive knowledge-of

Like rrusserl she claims

object and as a subject.

that we know <mother person as an

But like ;.:ill, she seems to identify knowledge

of other people witt1 knowledge of their minds.

~mpathy

is the name she gives

to the intuitive awareness of other people's experiences.

She says that we can

know the ex[1eriences of others as objects, or in a subjective way.

The pain

r
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of a friend, for example, can be given as an object of consciousness when
we turn towards the cause of his sadness, we cen appropriate subjectively.
Husserl would likely agree With Edith Stein's analysis, but he refuses to
reduce the

problem of other people to the problem of other minds.

He is

committed to the epistemological primacy of the body and bodily behaVior of
.the other.

They give

us knowledge of other people first.

Then it becomes

comprehensible that we could have empathic knowledge of their present state
' 125

of mi na.

Husserl treats the problem of other people much as his theory of method
leads us to believe that he would.

His description of ourknowledge of other

people corresponds almost exactly to his theory of the descriptive project.
However, he does not reduce the

objects of his description in the manner

prescribed by his theory of reductions.

Uor does the relationship between

the projects of reduction and description hold exactly as it should in a
descriptive science. _Let us examine each of these three

metho~ological

problems

individually.
Husserl's description of his knowledge of other people can be outlined
in five steps.

He begins by considering himself as an indiVidual person

straightforwardly aware of other people as objects in the world and at the
same time 2s subjects who experience the same world he does.

Secondly he

concentrates on himself as a transcendente.l ego, t!·ic:,t is, on the essential
structure of his existence as a person.

However, instead of clarifying the

essence of his personal existence through free imaginative variation, he does
so by reducing his existence to thet of a trenscendental egowhose essence he
c&n Epprehend.

~he

eidetic reduction, 1nsteLd of supplemLnting the third

step of descriptive method, seems to have displaced the one thet comes before

"----------------------------------------------------------------;;;ma::=:~-

it.
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Nevertheless, he apprehends the

transcen_dental-~go

as a

who is kinesthetically aware of himself as a moving object.
iS essentially connected to another as two

moving

organisms.

memb~rs

body-subject
He finds that he

of the class of living

The other•s class membership is confirmed by his varying

but harmonious behavior.

By imaginatively varying his position to that of the

other., the other becomes appresented to him as a body-subject having the same
experiences he would have if he were over there.
hiS awareness of himself as
existence as

Finally Husserl has described

an indivj_duai.,the clarification of his essential

a transcendental ego, his essentinl. identity, and his essential

connection with another.

All of these steps

can· be anticipated by his theory

of phenomenological description.
Husserl's theory of reduction does not fare so well.

Theoretice1ly, the

philosophical reduction should be followed by the eidetic and then by the
p_henoruenological ones.

But Husserl's search

fo~

the foundation of. interper- •

sonal relationships exhibits no sign of the phi_losophical epokhe.

'rhis kind

of reduction is supposed to make the intuition of objects possible by
eliminating speculative theories about them. _Since Husserl does begin with
his intuitions of himself as an individual person relating to others, we might
argue ipso facto thc:t the appropriate reduction has been performed.

But this

interpretation of his method, besides being very generous to Husserl , does
~iolence

to the self-reflectiveness of phenomenological procedure.

The

philosophicel reduction, if it has been performed at all, does not seem to be
a step of thought "which is immediately understood. 11126
Husserl's reduction of his existence as an individuai person to that
of a transcendental ego seems to be an eidetic one.

After the reductioru

he is no longer an individual person who can be contras~~~ \~Jo_th_o_~her~.

r-----------------------------------------------------------------7-8.....
The transcendental ego is not a unique historice.l personage, but the essential
structure of any personality.
Finally, Husserl's reduction of transcendental experience to the "sphere
of

0 wnness"

reduction.

seems to be the ultimate refinement of the phenomenological
At the beginning of the fifth meditation, Husserl explains.that

the transcendental or phenomenological reduction restricts observation and
description to
within it.

127

the stream of pure consciousness and the unities constituted
·Even earlier, in Ideas 1, he has spoken of the phenomenological

reduction as a "graded reduction."

128

For the first time we can see its app-

iication in different grades, the ultimate gradation being the reduction of
the objects in the ego's stream of consciousness to the ego's kinesthetic
awareness of himself as· an object.
Theoretically, there is supposed to be a certain relationship between
the reductive and descriptive
possible the

projects.

The

philosophical reduction makes

intuition of objects, and therefore, should precede the

intuition of individuals as instantiations of an essence.

The ·eidetic

intuition makes possible, and therefore, should immediately precede the
apprehension of an essence (or class) itself.

Fi~ally,

the phenomonological

reduction restricts the phenomonoloi:;ist to the description of the essences and
essential connections exactly as they appear to him.
Husserl's method of dealing with the problem of other people does not
show many signs of this relationship.

There are no indic&tions thct the

philosophical reduction hes been employed before the intuition of individual
objects.

The eidetic reduction appears before the apprehension of the

transcendental ego, but instead of supplementing, it appears to have displaced
the clerificotio.n of essences throuch free i::ia_g:!:ne'.tive vrn·iation of
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indi vidual.s.

Only the phenomenolocical. reduction, that is, the reduction

of the essential being of the ego to the sphere of ownness seems to occupy
its proper place and perform its correct function.
Vie

may conclude from this investigation: thzlt Husserl's procedure is

much less rigorous than his theory of method would lead us to believe.
time has come to correlate the results of

all our investigations.

'l.'he

~~--~-------------------------------------------------------------8-0-..
Chapter IV:

The Adequacy of Husserl• s Idea of Phenomenology

· It might, of course, be objected that Husserl has ·
maneuvered himself into an untenable position by his
insistance thatphiloso~hy by nothing less than a
strict science, but that is a criticism thatapplies
to the ideal, not to the consistency with which
Husserl has tried to realize the ideal. Like every
other philosopher. Husserl was a child of his times,
and his times would be satisfied with nothing less
than scientific verifiebility for every proposition
that is to be recognized as meaningful. .

* * * * *
Husserl himself would be the last to say that he had
evolved during his career a complete philosophy, or
even to say that.his method has been satisfactorily
formulated. l'1ore than once he expressed dissatisfaction with the formulation of that method. Of
two things, however, he never ceased to be conVinced:first of all, that philosophy as he conceived it
could develop only in accord with the scientific
ideal he had conceived from the beginning; and
secondly, that no development which in any way con•
tradicted the essential laws of intentional constitution ••• could possibly be admitted as genuinely
philosophical.

.. * * *
For the actual fruitfulness of this method we cannot
look to Husserl's own wor1-ts; we must look to those
who have, to a grec.ter or less extent, drawn much of
their inspiration from Husserl.
--"'uentin Lauer,
Phenomenology: Its Genesis
and Prospect, pp. 15~-161.
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In Ideas 1 Husserl speaks of phenomenology as a first philosophy, not
onlY in the sense of a

science upon which mathematics, loeic and other

disciplines must be built,
sciences.

but also

~s

for~al

the proper foundntion for the factual

·1'he verification of factual knowledge depends ultimately on the

meaningfulness of the claims that we perceive things, that we live in a
world, and that we relateto other people.

In order to

ver~fY.

scientifically

the meanings of these propositions, Husserl's phenomenology must
number of requirements.

It must have a

method, and there must be
In Ideas 1,

11

11

s~tisfy

a

scientif:i.c" foundation, a "scientific"

a certain harmonytt between them.

1

Husserl expresses the idea of phenomenology as a descrip-

tive science of essential being operative
immediate intUition.

2

strictly within the limits of

His definition establishes the intuition of essences

as the foundation of his new science,

As the foundation of a science, the

intuition of essence generates the demands not to speculate
but only to describe objects exactly as they appear.

~bout

the unseen,

From these two fundamen-

tal demands stem Husserl's reductive and descriptive projects.

The reductive

project consists of three reductions which should be applied in order.
Similarly, the descriptive project is composed of five methodical steps,
each of which builds on the insightfulness of the one which precedes it.
The foundation of phenomenology gives priority to the reductive project.
Each reduction is a section of the handrail that helps us up the stairs of
insight one step at a time.
The

aforementioned harmony between the foundGtion and methods of

phenomenology is what makes them scientific.

Quentin Leue.r suggests that

Husserl, being a child of his times, could be satisfied with nothing less than
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scientific verifiability for every meaningful statement.
that this ideal is untenable.

Our

investig~tiona

He also sugeests

of Husserl's attempt to

determine exactly the meaning of factual knowledge indicates that he has not
maintained his standards of scientific endeavour.

However, we are not yet in

a position to say whether Husserl's is an untenable ideal.
Lauer confrontes us with the task of determining whether the distance
between Husserl's methodology and his method can be bridged.

He suggests

that it can, but not in the context of Husserl's philosophy.

Lauer says that

for the fruitfulness of Husserl's method, we cannot look to his
must look
him.

o~n

work.

We

to other philpsophers who have dravm much of their inspiration from

Husserl's idea of phenomenology may serve to characterize, not his own

philosophy, but that of other philosophers who are supposed to be following in
the direction towards which he led.

Let us therefore also consider briefly

the wor.k of a man who has drawn much of his inspiration from Husserl, namely
Jean-Paul Sartre.
(1) Its Adequacy with Regard to His Own Work.
The problem of the foundation of factual knowledge can be sub-divided
into smaller problems, the problem of the object of perception, the world of
object~,

and other people in the world.

detail.

Let us now

We have investigated each of them in

correlate the results of our investigation_s, take a final

mee.sure of the distance between Husserl's theory and his practice, and
determine whether the gap between them can be bridged.

Husserl's idea of

phenomenology calls for descriptive and reductive projects; its foundation
gives to reductive endeavours.
Husserl's idea of scientific description corresponds almost exactly with
his descriptive nractices.

JU.s

desc~i:ption.

oCthe object of perception

r-----------------------------------------------.
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involves five steps, each of which follows in the order prescribed by his
theory of description.

3

Husserl's description of the world of objects also

corresponds exactly to his theory.
tion of other people.

4

The lone exception occurs in his descrip-

There, instead of bringing his essential existence as a

person to complete clarity by free imaginative variation,

he brackets h,is

individuelity and considers himself as an essentially epister.:!ological subject,
a transcendental

ego.

Despite the omission of the second step required by

Husserl's theory of description, he completes his project in the way his
theory demands.

5

Except for this one omission, his procedure is a precise

application of his methodology9
All evidence indic2tes that Husserl's theory of description, far from
being untenable, is almost within reach.

The only departure from his theory

points to a gap in Husserl's philosophy which can and must be closed.

The

clarification and analysis of the exact relationship between one• s real
existence as

a unique historical personage and one's essential existence as a

transcendental ego deserves much more attention than Husserl has given it.
'rhe clarification of their relationship would probagly open the door to a
reconciliation between Husserl's transcendental

egology and other projects

like Merleau-Ponty•s phenomenoloey of the body as a subject.

such a

reconciliation would require a grea.t deal of work, but no new methodological
principles.
Husserl's theory of reductions does not correspond nearly as closely with
his reductive practices.

In fact

his theory and practice are so far apart

thet it is doubtful whether we can speak of a correspondence between them at
all •

Husserl's thC'ory of reductions demands that the philosouhical reduction
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reductions.

while examining the object of perception, Husserl reverses this

order, applying the phenomenolocical., the eidetic, and then the philosophical
reductions, after vrhich he applies the phenomenological reduction again.
the application of eidetic brackets agrees with uusserl's theory.

6

unly

During his

investigations of the world of objects, Husserl suspends only the natural
viewpoint.

Its suspension exhibits characteristics of all three reductions,

which leads us to believe that he has applied them all at the same time.
This procedure is incompatible with Husserl's

7

theory of reductions •

.1.,.inally, Husserl 1 s consideration of our knowledge of other people comes closest
to the reductive procedure demanded by his methodoiogy.

Although there is no

evidence to indicc:te that he has deliberateJ.y applied the philosophical
reduction; the eidetic
order.

8

.and phenomenological reductions follow in the proper

Only the absense of the philosophical reduction is lacking to make

his procedure correspond with .Ilia theory of method.
chance that a re-examined and

So there is still a

amended reductive method will correspond

with his theory of reductions.
However, there is enough evidence to demand,

not only a re-examination

of Husserl's reductive practices, but also of his theory of reduction.

Lauer

seys that husserl was never completely satisfied with any formulation of his
theory of method.

iierbert Spiegelberg points out the reductive project as the

object of his dissatisfaction:
Even in his last decade Husserl was in the habit
of stating that no adequate account of the
phenomenolocical reduction had appeared as yet;
in fact, in his correspondence he referred to it
as the most difficult thing ever attem~ted in
philosophy, much as he insisted on its indispensableness for a genuine phenomenology.9
We can only conclude from thei:;e observDtions that Hw::serl does not apply his
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brackets scient1fical.Ly.
theory of reductions we

A doubt is also cast

upon the usefulness of the

attributed to Husserl in chapter two.

11

more

adequately developed theory of reductions or a more disciplined application of
his theory, or both, are re:;uired if Husserl's phenomenology is ever to become
a scientific discipline.
Finally, the foundation of phenomenology on the intuition of essence
demands that the reductive project should have priority over the descriptive
one:

the philosophical reduction is supposed to precede the intuition of

individuals, the eidetic reduction should precede the intuition

of their

essences, and the phenomenological reduction ensures that everything is
described only as it appears.

In his investigation of perceived objects,

the phenomenological reduction led to the

observation of individual

conscious events, the eidetic reduction to their clarification and analysis,
and the philosophical reduction to the intuition of their essential
10

connections. ·

When Husserl investigated the world of objects, he applied

all three brackets at once.

Their application was followed by the intuition

of essential connections amongst objects.

11

personal relationships the eidetic reduction

In his examination of interpreceded the consideration of

his essential existence as a transcendental ego, and the phenomenological
reduction led to his description of the ego in relation to another.

12

Only

in the case of his investigation of other people does the actual relationship
between projects bear any resemblance to the one prescribed by Husser1•s
methodology.
All the available evidence indicates that the actual relationship between
Husserl's reductive and descriptive projects is not the one demanded by his
theory of method.

The phenomenological methods used by Husserl are not
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scientific inasmuch as they are out of harmony with their foundation.

A great

deal, if not all of the required harmony, could be restored if it were
possible for Husserl to re-formulate his reductive project.
Husserl's idea of phenomenology
actual philosophy.

does bear some resenblance to his

He describes things almost exactly the way his idea

demands that he should.

Only his reductive practices, and perhaps also his

theory of reductions, should be reformed.

Husserl's interpreters agree that

he was never able to carry out such a reformation, never able to make
phenomenology a science himself.
towards which he worked

Nevertheless, his idea remained as the goal

all his life, a promised-land which he was able to

enVision at least,in part.
·(2) Its Adequacy with Regard to the Work of Sartre.
Although Husserl has failed to put his idea of phenomenology to
practice, it would be premature to condemn it as untenable without seeing
how successful his followers have been.
to the

As Lauer says, we may have to look

men who have been inspired by Husserl to judge the fruitfulness of

his method.

His influence on Jean-Paul Sartre can hardly be doubted.

Sartre

spent a considerable amount of time studying and absorbing Husserl's
.

philosophy.

13

The question is which of Sartre's works we should measure

against Huoserl's idea.
Nearly all of Se.rtre 1 s works could be cclled phenomenoloe;ical.
Sartre's reasons for giving them this name suggest which of his works it
would be most appropriate to examine.
after he refused the

~iobel

In a Playboy interView published soon

Prize for literature, he seid that:

••• I discovered "phenomenology", that is, 1 learned
that one could talk in a philosophicC'l.l way, ranging
further, snd more scientifically even, thrui the

r
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language of philosophic textbooks. I had the idea
of uniting literature and philosophy in n technique
of concrete expression--nit.!:l philosophy providing
the method and the discipline, alld literature su~ply
ing tile words. \'.'het interested me was unraveling the
curious and concrete relations between things end men,
and later between men and themselves •••
In my first novel, Heusea, I looked at trees and tried
to define just what they are by means of words so as
to t;et down to essenc·es; in other words I embarked
on a perpetual questioning of thingE, trying to
ascertain what they are.14
Phenomenology, he s?,ys, has a mode of expression the.t could be more sci en ti fie
than the language of academic philosophy.
language of

~rt

is more suitable for the description

concrete and the human.
exclusive.

He seems to think that the
of the curious, the

For Sartre, science and art are not mutually

The artist can produce scientific descriptions of human

relationships.

~artre

has opened new vistas of possibility for the

phenomenological movement.
modern academic philosophy,
be phenomenological.

16

uust as phenomology may be the secret longing of
15

so Sartre hints that works of art may secretly

Phenomenology may be modern philosophy striving to

become literature •
.nusserl,

with his special interest in the philosophy of mathematic,

logic and science,

could hardly have anticipated this development.

·.i:he only

way to determine its correspondence with Husserl's idea of phenomenology is
to examine one of Sartre's popular literc:ry works in hopes of sorting out his
descriptive and reductive endeavours,
ln Sartre's short story,

11

The Wall", we find a descriptive project

involving the five steps demanded by
and Tom Steinbock

and their common foundation.

r~usserl

's theory of method.

Pablo I bbieta

are introduced at the beginning of the story as two

individuals with nothing in common except that they are both prisoners by the

r~

r

I
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fascists during the Spanish civil was.

17

Subsequently events in the story make it clear to them that they are
•aiting to be executed.
Sartre then presents them as instantiations of an essence seen through
the eyes of Pablo Ibbieta:
I looked at him {Tom) sideways for the first time
he seemed strange tom:=: he wore death on his face •••
For the past 24 hours I had lived next to Tom, I
had listened to him.and !.realized we had nothing
in common. And now we looked as much alike as
twin brothers 1 simply because we were going to
die together. 1 8
Tom 1 i:> and Pablo's real enstence, their individuality, is suspended, as it
were, by consciousness of their impending death.
of the same class,

They are paired as members

we find an overlaying of each with the sense of the other.

Pablo sees Tom as a manifestation of death.
Sartre.traces the connections. amongst death and other essences through
the eyes of Pablo Ibbieta.
is.

Pablo tries in various ways to imagine what death

None of these variations reveals anything more about it.

gives up and begins to think of his
and death are inseparable connected.

away from.

past~

But when he

he discovers that awareness of life

Death is something that he cannot turn -

His whole life appears before him in a crowd of memories.

it has been a lie.

He sees

Because he never.thought of death, he had spent his life
.

counterfeiting eternity.
neither dee.th nor life.

19

· until this very moment he had understood nothing,

After realizing the essenticil connection between them,

Pablo turns c:.wc:y from the past.

It no longer has any value for him.

The reason for their essential

connection soon becomes evident.

Because of his heightened awareness he is able to see his situation in a new
lig~t.

lie sees thats
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••• objects hc:..d a funny look: they were more
obliterated, less dense then usual, It was
enough for me to look at the bench, the lamp,
the pile of coal dust to know that I was going
to die. Naturally I
couldn • t think clearly ·
about my death but I saw it everywhere, on
things, in the way things fell back andk:ept
their distance discretely, as people who
speak quietly at the bedside of.a dying men.
It was his death Tom had just touched on the
bench. '2U
Knowledge of life and death are

inseparable for Pablo because the death he

anticipates is his own•• Life and death are properties of the individual.
They are essentially connected because of their subsumption under this higher
genus.

We might way that,

in Sartre's philosophy, the anticipation of

one's death is one of the things that makes one an individual..

It is a

principle of individuation.
Sartre's short story exhibits, not only a descriptive projec't;, but also
a kind of reduction.

Under the sentence of death, Pablo's life as an

individual is suspended.

21

Even though he esc?pes execution by a surprising

turn of events, he is condemned to live the rest of his life as it were,
between the brackets of birth and death.

He, the soldiers guarding him,

and everyone else, are condemned to die and must wait for their sentence.
The only difference he observes is that some were going to die a little
later than him.

22

Pablo Ibbieta• s be;ing-towards-death, as imagined by Sartre,

is remarkably similar to Husserl's remarks about the existential import of
his reductive project.

Spiegelberg quotes-Husserl as saying that:

the total phenomenological attitude and the
corresponding epokhe is called upon to bring
about a complete personal transformation
which mieht be compared to a religious conversion, but which even beyond it has the
signific~nce of the greatest existential
conversion that is to be expected of mankinct. 23
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The_ reductive project

dem~nds

a complete personal transformation, a religious,

or an existential conversion.

A complete personal transformation is precisely

wh~t

Pablo Ibbieta has experienced.
The foundation of Sartre's phenomenological efforts in "The Wall" seems

to be the intuition of essences;.
of reduction, we

~annot

But since he fails to distingUish varieties

say that the phenomenology he builds upon it is

scientific by Husserl's standards.
less successful than Husserl

We can say, however, that he has been no

in approaching them.

Husserl's idea of

phenomenology applies to Sartre's literary works as well as it does to his
own academic philosophy.
(3) Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology Compared to
Samuel Johnson's Idea of Good Literature
Some art may be phenomenological, even by Husserl's
fact raises a question.
phenomenologists.

This

Some artists, like Sartre, may be Self-conscious

But may it not be the case that something·in the nature

of art itself makes it inherently phenomenologicaJ.2
(1709-1784)

stand~cds.

Because Samuel Johnson

is to modern literary criticism what Husserl is to

phenomenology, it seems appropriate to settle

the question by comparing

Johnson's standard of excellence in literatnre With Husserl's idea of
scientific phenomenoiogy.
In his "Preface to Shakespeare",

Johnson contrasts the absolute and

immediately recognizable excellence of demonstrative sciences with that of all
other works which is recognized only gradually and by comparing them to others.
He says the.t in li tere.ry works which, by their very nature, appee.l only to
observation and experience:
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Nothing can please many and please long but just
representations of genezal nature •••
Shakespeere above all writers, at least above
all modern writers, is the poet of nature •••
His characters act and' speak by the influence of
those general passions and principles by which
all minds are agitated ••• In the writings of other
poets a character is too often an individual; in
those of Shakespeare it is commonly a species.24
Johnson's

claim that works of art appeal only to observation and exper-

ience for standards of
as their foundation.

25

excellence establishes the intuition

of objects

The objects he appeals to are those of a general

nature, general passions and principles, and kinds of people.
terminology, he is appealing to the intuition of essences.

In Husserl's

ureat works of art,

he says, are nothing more than "just representi.tions of a general nature."
Only great works of art, then, can be phenomenological.
The only difference between Johnson•_s idea of good art and Husserl's
idea of phenomenology has to do with science.
science and art

As fal'

as Johnson could see,

were mutually exclusive because he thought that art was

based on observation, while science was demonstrative.

uur ideas of art

and sc.:i..ence have changed considerably since Johnson's time.

The task Husserl

sets himself is precisely that of making observation and description a
scientific

project.

Because Husserl failed

to accomplish his task, we

might say tnet his actua1 philosophy corresponds more closely to
<.Johnson's idea of good literature than it does to his own idea of
phenomenology.

i'le

miEht c;.lso sey, as Johnson would heve said, that only the

pessage of time and the judgment of future generations can determine how great
a philosopher Eusserl actually was.
his ideal.

i1e cvn, however, say a few things about

r
92
(4) Ten Conclusions about Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology.

1.

The nouular slogen "Back to·the things themselves!" is not an

adequate expression of Hussc-rl's idea.

The expression brings to mind Hume•s

positivistic doctrine that all our ideas are derived from simple impressions
~hich t~eY

faintly copy.

But phenomenology is not like British empiricism.

tie should not think that the things themselves of ilusserl' s philosophy are
only emp.irical objects to. w;1ich we can return only through perception.
2.

rtusserl thought of phenomenology as a descriptive science of essential

being operative wit:un the limits of irnr.:;.ediate intuition.

The objects of

phenomenology are the essences or class memberships of individuals and their
formal· relationships.

Classes and formal relations are objects of which

it is possible to be immediately aware.
awareness Qf these objects.

dema~ds

Scientific description of our a

a foundation in our immediate awareness

of them, a dedication to the demands stemming from the problematic nature of
our awareness, and a method dictated by the demanding nature of its problems.
3.

The nopular slogan

11

Back to the things themselves! 11 is an expression

of half of Hussrerl• s first principle of method.

The foundation of Husserl• s

phenomenology is the immediate intuition of essences.

As a methodological

foundation it generates the demands not to speculate about the unseen, but
only fo describe things exactly as they appee.r. The expression "Back to the
things themselves!" is equivalent to the mettodological coomandment to
describe things exactly as they appear.
4.

Husserl considered his first princi1)le of method to be the foundation

of phenomenolo&Y es e. ricorously clescriotive science.
is the commandment not to

His first principle

spedUlate about the unseen, but only to describe
-- ·"·--- : . - _____

:~---

·-

=----~--·-
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things as they

Its two demands are really different.

ap~ear.

the first priorit :- over ti1e second.

Husserl gives

His two demands generate reductive and

descriptive science built upon Husserl's foundation, the reductive project
has priority over the descriprive one.
5.

Husserl's phenomenology anproaches, but does not correspond with his
·~-

- - - .

idea of a rigorous science.

...

He was well aware of the discrepancy between his

ideal of phenomenological philosophy and phenomenology as he practiced it.
A truly scientific phenomenology was, for him, a promised land upon which he
would never set foot.
6.

He does not realize his ideal

it--the reductive

project~-

of a rigorous science because part of

is not sufficiently articulated.

Husserl's theory

of reductions is so unlike his reductive practices that we can hardly speak of
a correspondence between them at all.

The great distance between them calls,

not only for a re-examination of Husserl's reductive practices, but also of
his theory of reductions.
7.

Husserl's idea of phenomenology is at odds With

practiced by others.

as

phenome~olol?i.Y

Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, presents a description

of death based on the intuition of objects.

He describes various objects in

the manner prescribed by Husserl's idea of phenomenology.
to distinguish varieties

But since he fails

of reduction, we cannot say that his description is

scientific by Husserl's standards.

a.

The artistic expression of intuited essences is as close to his own

ideal as his own "phenornenolo[;ical " practices.
~orks

Semuel Johnson's claim thc-t

of art appeal only to observation and experience for standvxds of

excellence establishes the intuition of essences as their foundation.
objects he appeals to are ti10se of a general nature,

gcner~l

The

passions and

r
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principles, and kinds of people.
intuition of essences.

In Husserl's terminoloey, he is appealing to

The task Husserl sets himself is precisely thc:it of

making observation and description a scientific project.

Because he failed to

accomplish his tnsk, we micht say that by his own standards, his actual
philosophy is an.
9.

artistic description of

esse~ces,

not a scientific one.

The artistic impulse can be intrinsicallY phenomenological.

Samuel Johnson says that

works of art often portray only indiViduals; but in

great art works, the individual is portrayed as the just representation of a
general nature.

The goal of Husserl's phenomenology is "faithful conceptual

expression" in judgments general in form.·

Johnson• s standard of excellence

in art, and the goal of Husserl's phenomenology appear to be the same.
10.

Some works of art furnish phenomenological insights for philosophy.

Sartre's short story, "The Wall", for example, offers valuable insights into
the nature of death.

Samuel Johnson claims, in effect, that the works of

Shakespeare offer important phenomenological insights.

Phenomenology, as a

attempt to deal scientifically with qualitative-material has a great deal to
learn from the language of art.

Phenomenology requires·an expended notion of

"completely true and steady conceptual expression."
as language must therefore be undertaken.

A phenomenology of art
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